

J. Edgar Hoover

Director FBI., Washington

b6

b7C

Dear Sir:-

*Grant H. Newfield*

I wrote you yesterday sending a newspaper clipping about the spread of Influenza now starting over the country might be the GERMANS SECRET WEAPON THEY BRAG so much about. One clipping was put in the paper by the Cairo Health officer Dr. Stuckey.

Here is a plan you might use to get a clue on this. The Flu mite be spread by GERMS by sabateurs and those DOCTORS are the ones who know all about GERMS and the sabatuer could be a doctor in the employ of the ENEMY. and a Doctor could play both ends of the game he could be the one who spread them or advised those who did spread the how to do it IN EACH CITY you could watch Doctors who advise the people about how to protect gainst the FLU and CHECK on them like this you could send a FBI investigator to the Doctor and Say. HOW MANY CASES OF FLU ARE IN THIS CITY? HOW MANY CASES DO YOU ATTEND TO? HOW BAD ARE THE CASES OF FLU YOU HAVE? OR KNOW ABOUT.? HOW MANY DEATHS HAVE OCCURRED BY FLU THIS YEAR OR MONTH? And if the number of cases were not numerous enough or were not BAD enough to justify the NOTICES he had put in the paper then you could find out who advised him to put the notice in the paper and find out who is connected to him in his line of business In POLITICS of course if he ~~is~~ is a health officer and that way you mite find it was some of his connections were the Enemy Sabateurs.

Resp

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 ucl/nw/bja/rm

RECORDED  
&  
INDEXED  
90

100-93210-106

*8/6*

*ans  
11/14/44  
12.00*

100-93216-106  
RECORDED

January 4, 1944



b6

b7C

This Bureau has received your recent communication, and I desire to assure you that its contents will be given appropriate consideration.

Very truly yours,  
2


John Edgar Hoover  
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60262 uc/hue/ga/pme


*[Handwritten signature]*

Mr. Tolson.....
Mr. E. A. Tamm.....
Mr. Clegg.....
Mr. Glavin.....
Mr. Ladd.....
Mr. Nichols.....
Mr. Tracy.....
Mr. Rosen.....
Mr. Carson.....
Mr. Coffey.....
Mr. Hendon.....
Mr. Holloman.....
Mr. Quinn Tamm.....
Mr. Nease.....
Miss Gandy.....



b6

b7C



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60262 UC/NUS/bja/pau

December 16, 1943

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

This is a report on vibration which I believe to be  
sabotage.

As stated to you previously, [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

*Bacterial Warfare*

ENCL. H

1944

144

180

b6  
b7C  
b7D

INDEXED 100-95216-100

EX-31

*Mentally sound  
no air. necessary*

b6  
b7C

b6

b7C

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,  
F B I  
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 UCW/s/bj/ma

Dear sir:

Just a short note which you need not answer; I realize  
that your time is limited.

I would like to suggest that perhaps a secret weapon of  
the Nazis is the meat or butter from Argentina, where the  
Nazi are thick, saturated with the germs which are re-  
sponsible - when these foods reach the United States - for  
the Flu epidemic which is so disastrous to our war effort  
because it produces so much absenteeism. Perhaps this is  
accompanied by domestic German enemy alien germ spreading  
cooperation. I hope you will investigate this possibility.

Patriotically yours,

Postoffice Clerk.

JAN 11 1944

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b7C

*Officially Unfiled*

64-8  
JAN 11 1944

306 (100)

RECORDED & INDEXED

100-93216-10

*[Handwritten signature]*



JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR



EPC:AF  
100-93216

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

January 22, 1944

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

Re: [REDACTED]

Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Coffey  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols ✓  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. McGuire  
Mr. Mumford  
Mr. Piper  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room

In my memorandum of December 31, 1943, concerning a visit with [REDACTED] I mentioned [REDACTED] These latter designations are used by [REDACTED] organization to preserve the confidential nature of some of their most secret poison preparations. I do not know what [REDACTED] is. However, with regard to [REDACTED] quote the following from my memorandum dated August 2, 1943, following a visit to [REDACTED] where he had a small plant manufacturing in an experimental way [REDACTED]:

*Bacterial Warfare*



DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 ucl/wsl/bj/pan  
7-21-2004

RECORDED & INDEXED  
Respectfully,  
E. P. Coffey.  
100-93216-110  
27 JAN 26 1944

b6  
b7C

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

CC 7

Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols ✓  
Mr. Rosen ✓  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mumford \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Piper \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Beahm \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

EPC:AF

December 31, 1943

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nuc/bj/pan  
ON 7-21-2004

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

Re: Bacterial Warfare

This morning I had a general conversation with [redacted]  
He confidentially stated that [redacted]

[redacted] In other words, we have definite information that the enemy prefers to use bacterial warfare over gas warfare and furthermore that the enemy is prepared and stocked up for bacterial warfare.

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b6  
b7C  
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51  
FEB 9 1944

RECORDED  
&  
INDEXED

100-93216-111  
27 JAN 26 1944

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b7C

Memorandum for Mr. Tamm

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[redacted] was in the process of arranging a conference for this afternoon between OSS officials, Army officials, and his own group and he said he hoped OSS and the Army would iron out their difficulties.

Respectfully,

*EP*  
E. P. Coffey.



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO  
FILE NO. 65-1409

**Bureau of Investigation**  
**United States Department of Justice**  
1308 Masonic Temple Building  
New Orleans 12, Louisiana  
January 27, 1944

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm



Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Acers  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Mumford  
Mr. Starke  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy  
Files

**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL**

Director, FBI

Att'n: TECHNICAL LABORATORY

Re: BACTERIAL WARFARE

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated June 7, 1943, in the above matter requesting that any information in regard to bacterial warfare on the part of the enemy should be forwarded to the Bureau.

On January 10, 1944, [redacted] advised this office that [redacted] the subject of an espionage case in which the New York Field Division is office of origin, who is presently residing in [redacted] had furnished him with the following information:

[Large redacted block]

The informant stated that if he should obtain additional information concerning this matter from the subject he would furnish that information to this office.

Very truly yours

A. P. KITCHIN  
SAC

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NW/gj/DM  
ON 7-21-2004


KWD:ms

RECORDED  
&  
INDEXED

100-93216-112  
F B I  
32 JAN 31 1944

55 MAR 4 1944

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b7C



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b7C

Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

American Embassy  
London, England  
February 15, 1944

~~SECRET~~

Communication 2443

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
VIA DIPLOMATIC AIRCOURIER POUCH

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Personal Attention of Director

Dear Sir:

b1

[Redacted]  
[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]  
[Redacted] (S)

b1

[Redacted]  
[Redacted] (S)

b1

Very truly yours,

[Redacted Signature]

b6

b7C

Legal Attache

7.21.2004  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60267 uc/urs/bja/pam  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(6) 7/21/2029

Attachments 34

ENCLOSURE (27) man

*ack 3-2-44*



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

RECORDED  
&  
INDEXED 34

100-93216-113  
IF IB I  
27 MAR 7 1944

~~SECRET~~

*WJ*

*REMAN 9/11/47*

EAT,DS

~~SECRET~~

54

RECORDED

March 2, 1944

Legal Attache  
American Embassy  
London, England

b6

b7C

Dear [redacted]

With reference to your letter of February 15, 1944, transmitting a communication [redacted] upon (S) the subject of bacterial warfare, I, of course, fully appreciate the very delicate nature of this subject. As you know, the matter is completely and entirely without the scope of the Bureau's jurisdiction. I am taking no action in this matter at the present time because of my desire to avoid any embarrassment to your contact in London. While logically it would appear that the Bureau should furnish the substance [redacted] memorandum to the proper governmental agency, probably [redacted] (S) very intelligence, I will not take this action until you advise whether it would in any way jeopardize your relationship with the source of your information in London. b1

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

7-21-2004

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 ucl/wsl/jal/pau  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 33(6) 7-21-2029

CC- Liaison Section- [redacted]

DEPT. OF JUSTICE

FBI

RECEIVED-ROSEN DIA 2

MAR 1 2 30 PM '44

INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

RECEIVED

Tolson  
E. A. Tamm  
Clegg  
Coffey  
Glavin  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Acers  
Carson  
Harbo  
Hendon  
Munroe  
Stark  
Quinn Tamm  
Nease  
Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 10

MAR 5 1944 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MAR 3 10 54 AM '44

55 MAR 16 1944

DEPT. OF JUSTICE

FBI

RECEIVED-WAIT ROOM

MAR 4 5 58 PM '44

U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED READING ROOM

MAR 2 5 18 PM '44

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TO : MR. E. A. Tamm  
FROM : MR. E. P. COFFEY

RE: April 4, 1944

SUBJECT:

RE: March Committee Meetings-  
Joint Cryptanalysis Committee  
Bacterial Warfare Committee  
Committee VIII of the Board of  
War Communications  
National Academy of Sciences Committee  
on Truth Serum  
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee

b6

b7C

There follows a status report covering the month of March, 1944, regarding committees on which I serve, representing the Bureau:

INTERDEPARTMENT RADIO ADVISORY COMMITTEE: This committee held a meeting on March 2, 1944, and [redacted] Attended. Only two items at this IRAC meeting concerned the Bureau. The first was the approval without objection of the extension of authority on the FBI frequency 11490 KC whereby we are permitted to use 3 kilowatts of power and tone modulation on this frequency. The second item dealt with the move of the radio station from Juneau, Alaska to Anchorage, Alaska and resulted in the approval of nine Bureau frequencies for use at Anchorage.

With regard to the following committees, it would appear that they have all ceased to function in that no meetings have been held as long as a year in most instances. I propose, therefore, that they be eliminated henceforth from my monthly reports on committees unless it is desired that I carry them in an inactive status.

JOINT CRYPTANALYSIS COMMITTEE: This committee composed of FBI, Army, and Navy representatives serves under the Joint Intelligence Conference. No meetings were held during March and there has been no activity on the part of this committee in over fifteen months.

○ BACTERIAL WARFARE COMMITTEE: This is [redacted] committee. The FBI received no notice of any meetings to be held during March.

b6

COMMITTEE VIII, BOARD OF WAR COMMUNICATIONS: This is the police and municipal service committee of the Board and no meetings were held during March.

b7C

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES COMMITTEE ON TRUTH SERUM: This committee under the National Academy appears to have been abolished and the work taken over by OSS. The FBI received no notice of any meetings to be held during March.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 uc/nws/lja/pmm

RECORDED

EX-31

100-93216-114

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

APR 15 1944

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL FILE

1 APR 26 1944

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-1144-28

EPC:AF

~~SECRET~~

May 12, 1944

~~SECRET~~

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
VIA U.S. ARMY TRANSPORT COMMAND

Legal Attache  
American Embassy  
London, England

b6

b7C

Dear [redacted]

Please refer to the Bureau's letter of March 2, 1944, and your letter of February 15, 1944, [redacted] on the subject of material warfare. and sabotage.

370

(S)

b1

Please advise the Bureau whether you have had any further discussion [redacted] and whether any further action on the part of the Bureau in this matter is recommended at this time.

(S)

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

CC-Liaison Section

7-21-2004  
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 ucl/nw/bjalpan  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3 (6) 7-21-2029

SE 28

RECORDED

RECORDED

MAY 12 1944

100-93216-115  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
MAY 15 1944  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
MAILED  
MAY 12 1944  
P. M.  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Coffey  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Mumford  
Mr. Jones  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

77 JUN 16 1944



**Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice**

American Embassy  
London, England  
May 18, 1944

~~SECRET~~

Communication 3051

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
VIA ARMY COURIER SERVICE

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Liaison Section

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the Bureau's letter of May 12, 1944,  
which made reference to the Bureau's letter of March 2, 1944 and  
my letter of February 15, 1944, [redacted] b1

[redacted] on the subject of bacterial warfare sabotage (S)

The Bureau may take whatever action they deem appropriate  
in this matter, [redacted]

Very truly yours, [redacted] (S) b1

b6

b7C

Legal Attache

MJL:JB.



7-21-2004  
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NW/bj/fan  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(6) 7-21-2029

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

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b7C

RECORDED

100-93216-116  
F B I  
35 JUN 1944

~~SECRET~~

*E.P. Coffy*  
*P.C.*  
Experiments concerning defence against bacterial warfare and sabotage have been pursued in this country for some years. The subject has always been considered as ultra-secret because, apart from obvious reasons, it was considered that any leakage to the enemy, either through indiscretion or espionage, that we were interested in this subject might cause the enemy to start this type of warfare or to make propaganda about Allied intentions. Consequently most elaborate security measures have always been laid on.

At a certain stage in this research work it was felt desirable to increase the scale of experiments, and I understand that the United States has approached and certain authorities agreed to carry out very much larger scale experimental work in the U.S. than was possible over here. Liaison on this subject in this country is maintained with [redacted]

It is said that bacterial warfare research in the United States comes under the U. S. Chemical Warfare Service, but it is also said that the U. S. War Department accepts no responsibility for bacterial warfare research, though they raise no objection to the Chemical Warfare Service carrying out work on it as "an agent on behalf of [redacted]"

In addition to work being done by the Chemical Warfare Service, which is centred in Camp Detrich about 40 miles from Washington, which is in charge of an ex-oil chemist named Colonel Chittick, there is a certain amount of work of a laboratory nature going on in various outside institutions which, in the past, has been under the immediate direction of [redacted]

[redacted] It is thought that there may recently have been some changes in the set up.

It is said that [redacted] has appointed two "Public Relations Officers" for the subject of bacterial warfare research, one of them being [redacted]

According to a report made by an English professor who visited America to discuss this subject, certain aspects of security were not maintained at as high a level as in England. It seems that in view of the repercussions there would be if there was the slightest leakage about this matter, the whole of this subject should be closely examined from the security point of view. R

RECORDED

100-93216-116  
F B I  
41 JUN 12 1944  
3

*Copy furnished to [redacted]*  
*191 Col [redacted]*  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60216 TDC/mell/jp/mac

79 JUL 19 1944

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

EPC:AF

TO : MR. E. A. TAMM *5734*

DATE: 6/14/44

FROM : E. P. COFFEY *WV*
 a SUBJECT: Bacterial Warfare - 100-93216  
Lt. Col. Howard Irving Cole

Mr. Tolson	.....
Mr. E. A. Tamm	.....
Mr. Clegg	.....
Mr. Coffey	.....
Mr. Glavin	.....
Mr. Ladd	.....
Mr. Nichols	.....
Mr. Rosen	.....
Mr. Tracy	.....
Mr. Mohr	.....
Mr. Carson	.....
Mr. Hendon	.....
Mr. Mumford	.....
Mr. Jones	.....
Mr. Quinn Tamm	.....
Nease	.....
Gandy	.....

b6

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[redacted] called at my office today and introduced [redacted] is a chemist who has a lifetime of experience in leprosy, in the chemistry and treatment thereof.

[redacted] advised [redacted]

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[redacted] suggested that henceforth any exchange of data on the subject of bacterial warfare be handled through [redacted]

[redacted] further advised that [redacted]

b6

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EX-38

RECORDED

INDEXED

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In a general conversation I gathered that the work [redacted] is progressing satisfactorily and that they are in production up there now. On the other hand the work at their other secret plant, which is somewhere down in [redacted] appears not yet to be in production.

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[redacted] further stated that requests for furnishing information to [redacted] would be confirmed in a letter to the Director from [redacted] for the present, will continue to maintain his offices in the National Academy of Sciences Building.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60262/UC/WWS/bp/DAL

EX-38

49  
74 JUN 27 1944

# Current Book Company

212 1206 FIFTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK, N. Y.

June 8, 1944

Walter Winchell, Esq.  
c/o The New York Mirror  
235 E. 45th Street  
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Winchell:

Recently a copy of ~~Japan's~~ Secret Weapon was forwarded you - because of its startling disclosures. Many newspapers are doing feature articles on this expose' and if you are interested in having some "inside information" we shall be glad to assist you in every possible way.

This book is the first book - Thoroughly documented - on disease (germ) warfare, and shows that the Japanese were contemplating germ warfare as early as 1938.

We welcome your comments.

Very truly yours,

Current Publishing Co.

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b7C

RR/EG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 ucl/nus/ga/pam

RECORDED  
&  
INDEXED

100-93216-118  
FBI  
105 37 JUN 30 1944

b6

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*Bacterial Warfare*

*To Harry*

*ack WW  
6-20-44  
See 100-325446  
HCC*

*6/30/44  
my 8/9/44  
my 6/29/44  
get copy (B)*

*Five-  
L.A. Board to R.E.*

52 JUL 31 1944 76

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

JFB:TD

TO :

MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: 6-30-44

FROM :

J. F. Buckley

SUBJECT:

"JAPAN'S SECRET WEAPON" -  
Japanese Matter

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Mumford \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Jones \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_

b6

b7C

Reference is made to the letter received from Walter Winchell which was addressed to him by [redacted]

[redacted] under date of June 8, 1944. [redacted] alleges that a copy of the book "Japan's Secret Weapon" has startling disclosures and "inside information."

**ACTION:** Inasmuch as the Bureau is not in possession of the contents of this book and in view of the indication that it will probably receive widespread publicity, the NY Office was telephonically advised today to obtain a copy of the book and forward it to the Bureau immediately so that it can be reviewed.

b6

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3/8/90 BY SP1AESC

307009

*Book reviewed +  
forwarded to laboratory  
8/7/44*

RECORDED  
&  
INDEXED

100-93215117  
F B I

37 JUN 30 1944

EX-51

52 JUL 31 1944

74

*Bacterial Warfare*



TDB:AWK

100-93216

**Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.**

August 30, 1944

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mumford \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Piper \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Beahm \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CONLEY

Re: "Japan's Secret Weapon"  
by Barclay Newman - Book Review.

Following is an analysis of the contents of the above-entitled book, by Mr. Beach of this section.

"The fore part of the book is devoted to hysteria creating announcements by the author that the bacteriologists of the Japanese Military Department and the subsidized research laboratories of Japan have fully prepared disease producing organisms for bacterial warfare and sabotage; that they have used the secret weapon experimentally on China (bubonic plague, infected material dropped from airplanes) and undermined the defenders of Bataan by spreading malaria.

The author exhibits considerable knowledge of tropical disease bacteria and human parasites. He sets out to describe diseases caused by the germs and insists that the Japanese scientists have stepped up the virulence of these germs in Japanese laboratories for purposes of total destruction. He has completely ignored the fact that many of the diseases he mentions are unknown as regards the manner in which they are spread in nature as well as the fact that some of them have resisted methods of culturing.

b6

b7C

The end of the book is devoted to a plea for more consciousness of the dangers of what he chooses to term "Oligodynamic Warfare"; what dangers are in store for this country when the troops return to this country from the tropics at termination of hostilities. He also makes a bid for a tremendous increase in medical research and in the entire medical field to promote health and welfare in post-war years.

There is attached a book review by T. A. Bisson which was clipped from the Book of the Month Club "News" for August, 1944 and which very well describes the book from the lay standpoint. Also attached is the book itself."

Respectfully,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3/8/90 BY SP1000  
P. (27) 1392041

307009

RECORDED & INDEXED  
D. J. Parsons 139

100-93216-120  
F B I  
27 SEP 6 1944



52 SEP 27 1944

WV

EX-44

SIS-CHC  
12-13

# Japan's Secret Weapon

By BARCLAY NEWMAN



BARCLAY NEWMAN

THE facts presented in this sensation-ally written exposé of Japan's secret preparations for disease warfare are sufficient to establish a prima facie case which calls for further study and investigation. Sober evidence adduced by the author is weakened by the exaggerated tone and style of the writing. It seems clear that Japanese scientists, centered in the Tokyo Institute for Infectious Diseases, have devoted immense effort to stepping up the potency of epidemic disease carriers. Yoneji Miyagawa, director of the Institute, is pictured as a world authority in this field, which particularly includes research on viruses, bacilli, fungi, and cancer-creating chemicals. Convincing proof exists that the Japanese have resorted to disease warfare in China. The facts attending several recent outbreaks of plague in China, as well as the testimony of responsible Chinese and foreign doctors on the scene, leave small doubt of deliberate Japanese efforts to spread disease carriers. Beyond these substantial items of evidence, strengthened by the analogy in Japanese use of opium as a wholesale demoralizer, the book depends largely on innuendo and suggestion to build up its case. The more extreme prognostications of the author as to what the world is to experience from Japan's disease laboratories during the final stages of the war may also be discounted. It must be added, nevertheless, that there is a disturbing side to this book, that it is not entirely spun out of whole cloth. It would be reassuring to know that medical personnel from the armed services, preferably with a knowledge of Japanese, were engaging in a thorough examination of the whole subject. (Price, \$2.50)

T. A. Bisson

Book of the Month Club  
News. August 1944

13

100-93216-120

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 307009  
DATE 3/8/90 BY RPLAGJC

1873 **Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

FGT:LP

100-93216

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: August 8, 1944

FROM : J. F. Buckley

b6

SUBJECT: BACTERIAL WARFARE

b7C

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Coffey  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Mumford  
Mr. Jones  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Beahm  
Miss Gandy

b6

b7C

There was referred to the Bureau, by Walter Winchell, a letter from [redacted] describing a book entitled "Japan's Secret Weapon" by Barclay Newman.

This book, secured through the New York Field Office, asserts that the Japanese will engage in bacteriological warfare and purports to describe the methods which the Japanese plan to use.

ACTION:

As it appears that this book is primarily of interest to the Laboratory, it is suggested that it be forwarded to the Technical Laboratory for their information.

RECORDED &amp; INDEXED

EX - 40

100-93216-121

SEP 10 1944

57 SEP 29 1944

217  
in Bureau Library  
9-15-44 Efk

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267UC/NUS/Kjap/m



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
SWR:MGC

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

b6

DATE: December 9, 1944

FROM : Mr. S. S. Alden

b7C

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Coffey  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Mumford  
Mr. Jones  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Beahm  
Miss Gandy

While discussing matters of interest to the Bureau with

[redacted] Special Agent [redacted] of the Liaison Section pointed out to Colonel Moses that the Bureau was interested in receiving any information concerning foreign sabotage methods and techniques.

[redacted] inquired of [redacted] whether or not the Bureau would be interested in any information pertaining to bacteriological warfare. [redacted] explained to [redacted] to some length that it would be of great assistance to the work being carried on by the Bureau, especially pertaining to its possible use by saboteurs in the United States. [redacted] stated that he understood the Bureau's interest, but that he could not distribute information to the Bureau without the authority of certain individuals outside of the Military Intelligence Service.

It should be noted that the War Department is carrying on extensive research work of a most confidential nature dealing with bacteriological warfare. As you will recall, this work is being carried on by several isolated organizations under the supervision of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

[redacted] pointed out to [redacted] that if he was furnished with a letter by the Bureau stating the Bureau's interest in bacteriological warfare information he would gladly furnish this letter to a committee which would meet and determine whether or not any information developed along these lines could be brought to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It is suggested that this be routed to the Sabotage Section for their consideration and if they are desirous of procuring this information that a letter be addressed to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Attention: [redacted] setting forth the Bureau's interest in this matter, which letter should be returned to [redacted] for personal delivery to [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2001 BY 60267 Uchus/gja/Pnn

I Believe we are  
up-to-date on this  
THRU  
51 DEC 22 1944

b6

b7C

RECORDED

49

100-93216122  
F B I  
DEC 14 1944

## Oregon Has Jap Balloon Hunt

PORTLAND, Or., Dec. 31 (UP)—  
The Portland office of the FBI an-  
nounced tonight it is investigating  
reports that a large Japanese bal-  
loon has been found about 10 miles  
west of Estacada, Or., in a heavily  
wooded area.

11/11/45  
ack  
CC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 307009  
DATE 5/7/90 BY SP1 AG/CC

100-93216-123  
ENCLOSURE

CC:ELC  
100-93216-123

January 11, 1945

RECORDED



b6

b7C

Dear [Redacted]

Your letter of January 3, 1945, with enclosure, is before me for acknowledgment.

I have carefully noted the content of your communication and enclosure and wish to thank you for bringing the information contained therein to my attention.

If in the future you should obtain any additional information which you believe to be of interest to this Bureau, I want you to feel free to communicate directly with the Special Agent in Charge of our San Francisco Field Division which is located at Room 1729, 111 Sutter Building, San Francisco 4, California.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 3/8/90 BY SP1 AGJ  
307009

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
MAILED 3  
JAN 11 1945 P.M.  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

61 JAN 15 1945

DLB  
GAT

114

TELEON  
COPE/

TELETYPE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uclmllg/bmc  
ON 7-21-2004

FBI BUTTE

1-12-45

b6

3-47 PM

DIRECTOR

FBI

b7C

URGENT

DELIVERY ON: EACH

JAPANESE BALLOON LANDING KALISPELL, MONTANA, DECEMBER

ELEVEN, FORTYFOUR, ESPIONAGE.

HAS JUST CALLED AND REQUESTED THAT AGENTS IN EXAMINING PLACES  
WHERE BALLOONS ARE FOUND, LOOK FOR SMALL VIALS. HE STATES THAT  
THERE ARE ABOUT FOUR DISEASES OF LIVESTOCK WHICH COULD  
PRACTICALLY WIPE OUT LIVESTOCK IN THIS COUNTRY AND THAT IT IS  
REPORTED THAT LIVESTOCK DISEASE GERMS HAVE BEEN SPREAD IN RUSSIA  
AND IN CHINA BY ENEMY AGENTS.

53 FEB 13 1945  
ACK AND HOLD PLS

5-50 PM OK FBI WASH DC MVC

b6

b7C

FEB 7 1945

ORIGINAL-DIRECTOR

00 Bacterial Warfare

copy to [redacted] 1/21/45  
handed to ONI & G-1  
1/21/45 n.m.  
X

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nus/glpam  
CN 11-1-2004

American Embassy  
London, England  
June 1, 1945

60267 uc/nus/glpam 11-1-2004

ATTENTION: SIS EUROPEAN DESK

VIA US ARMY COURIER SERVICE

Director, FBI  
Washington, D. C.

b6

b7C

Dear Sir:

Re: BACTERIAL WARFARE

As of interest to the Bureau, there is set out below  
a copy of a letter which [redacted]

[redacted] addressed to [redacted]  
[redacted] which [redacted] made avail-  
able to me: (S)(U)

"In reviewing the files of one [redacted]  
[redacted] who was engaged upon the German  
bacteria warfare program the attached report was noted and was  
thought to be of interest to your office. This report is dated  
[redacted] and comes from a [redacted] to [redacted]  
[redacted] It is a report of his trip to Switzerland from 9 to  
23 August 1943, at which time he attempted to obtain information  
on B. W."

b6

b7C

The report which is classified as ~~Secret~~, reads as follows:

"SIN No. 245/43g

OKH-SIN

No. 30F/43g

RECORDED

1. [redacted] Informed by  
[redacted] subject of BW - promised aid or help on the matter.

2. Rpts expected from following on BW: German Legation Bern:

[redacted]  
[redacted] EX - 39  
RECORDED & INDEXED

3. [redacted] declared himself willing to obtain  
information on BW from friends.

4. [redacted] Appears to be anti-German, has Jewish assistant. Has  
not been approached by [redacted] However, [redacted]

[redacted] - willing to get information from Moser on BW.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

b6

b7C

~~SECRET~~

50 JUL 5 - 1945

DATE: 7-21-2004  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60267 uc/nus/glpam  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 7-21-2029



~~SECRET~~

5. [redacted] Described as cautious by politically reliable. Had no information on BW - willing to work on it. [redacted] receives regularly the Veterinary Bulletin English, which could be photostated on information on animal BW.

b6

b7C

6. Contact not yet established with [redacted] - Working with [redacted] acquired thru [redacted]

7. [redacted] - Carefully approached on BW. Promised to get more information within next 2 months. Mentions [redacted] whom he believes has information on BW. Also referred to Dr. Flauchiger (Davos) who has written book on disease of animals.

b6

b7C

8. [redacted] - contacted on BW promised help.

9. Confidential with representative of [redacted] Appeared to be informed on subject and promised continued interest. [redacted]

b6

b7C

b7D

10. Confidential with [redacted] on questions of Red Cross. [redacted] much upset of possibility of BW. Res. of names to be contacted for further information on BW:

[redacted]

Very truly yours,

*J. A. Cimperman*

J. A. Cimperman  
Assistant Legal Attache

JAC:FML

~~SECRET~~

Mr. E. (A) Tamm  
 Mr. Clegg  
 Mr. Coffey ✓  
 Mr. Glavin  
 Mr. Ladd  
 Mr. Nichols  
 Mr. Rosen  
 Mr. Tracy  
 Mr. Carson  
 Mr. Egan  
 Mr. Hendon  
 Mr. Pennington  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm  
 Mr. Nease

MSW:mkm

July 6, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

b6

b7C

You may be interested in the following information which was reported by the SAC of the Norfolk Field Division following a Weekly Intelligence Conference on June 28, 1945.

[redacted] attended this conference and brought with him as a guest [redacted]

b6

U.S. Army Air Forces, Langley Field, Virginia. [redacted] had until recently been assigned to handling investigations concerning the landing of Japanese balloons in the states of North and South Dakota and Nebraska. The pertinent portion of the SAC's letter follows: (S)(X)(u)


b7C

"I was interested to learn that recently several Japanese balloons were found in that territory which were determined to have been carrying bacteria. The bacteria consisting of Anthrax, are placed in the hydrogen. I was told that such bacteria mainly effects cattle. When the bacteria lands on wheat or other types of farm land where food is being raised for the cattle, the bacteria remain in the food when it is eaten by the cattle, and upon human consumption of the milk or meat, the bacteria can be passed on. He stated that the Army is not greatly concerned over the number of such balloons which have been located, but that it does show a different trend in the Japanese attack, due to the fact that such balloons in the past have been known only to carry small bombs. (S)(X)(u)

Respectfully,

b6

b7C



EX-6

RECORDED

File in  
100-93216

26 1945

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/Nuc/ga/pac  
 ON 7-21-2004

THIS MEMORANDUM IS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES  
 BE DESTROYED AFTER ACTION IS TAKEN AND NOT SENT TO FILES

60 AUG 4 1945

Director, FBI AIR MAIL

4-18-47


SAC, Boston

THE FAS; BIOLOGICAL WARFARE  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

REFER FIVE-IS

Reference is made to Boston letters and teletypes of an earlier date reflecting that G-2 at Boston is extremely desirous of obtaining any information pertaining to discussions of biological warfare by members of the subject organization. The Bureau has stated that it would furnish such information directly to G-2 at Washington, D. C.

\_\_\_\_\_ attended a meeting of \_\_\_\_\_



*Biological Warfare*

*ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-344452-58*

b2  
b6  
b7C  
b7D

SF 32 *100-93214-12*  
RECORDED *100-350312*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE *7-21-2004* BY *60267 uc/mst/gp/rae*


EX-75 *100-350312*  
FBI  
55 MAY 6 1947

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL



Director, FBI

4-18-47



b6  
b7C  
b7D

Inasmuch as [redacted] at Boston have indicated [redacted]

[redacted] it is felt that the Bureau may well wish to communicate the foregoing to the Army. Additional developments as disclosed to the informant will be promptly reported to the Boston Field Division and thus transmitted to the Bureau.

In the absence of specific directions, the Boston Field Division will not engage in any investigation beyond that of informant coverage.

BSG:cwm  
100-19119

COPY: FQ

EX-75

RECORDED

Date:

May 5, 1947

To:

Director of Intelligence  
War Department General Staff  
The Pentagon  
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention:

From:

John Edgar Hoover, Director - Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject:

THE FAS; BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Information has been received from a reliable and extremely  
confidential source that on April 16, 1947, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6

b7C

b7D

RGF:mjp

100-311162

DECLASSIFIED BY

ON

7.21.2004

58 MAY 21 1947

According to the informant. [redacted]

[redacted]

b6

b7C

b7D

The above is furnished to you for your information and any action deemed appropriate. It would be appreciated if you would advise whether any of the material mentioned by [redacted] is classified by the War Department.

COPY: PQ

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
MAY 22, 1947  
TELETYPE

WASH FROM NEW YORK 9 22 6-36 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

[REDACTED] ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL ACT. ON THE EVENING OF  
[REDACTED] CONF. INFO [REDACTED]  
MAY TWENTY, FORTYSEVEN, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED]

b2

b7D

b2  
b6  
b7C  
b7D

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-346735-27

[REDACTED] IN VIEW OF LETTER TO THE BUREAU FROM THE  
BOSTON OFFICE DATED APRIL EIGHT, FORTYSEVEN ADVISING THAT CIG  
STATED THAT BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IS SECOND IN SECRECY TO ATOMIC ENERGY,  
THIS INFO IS BEING FORWARDED SO THAT THE BUREAU MAY ADVISE SID IF IT  
SO DESIRES.

SCHEIDT

HOLD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 DCM/MS/bja/pau

58 JUN 10 1947

RECORDED  
&  
INDEXED  
35

100-938216-1241  
100-350312  
FBI  
43 JUN 8 1947  
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. LADD

DATE: 9/4/47

FROM : E. G. Fitch

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson ✓  
 Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓  
 Mr. Clegg ✓  
 Mr. Coffey ✓  
 Mr. Glavin ✓  
 Mr. Ladd ✓  
 Mr. Nichols ✓  
 Mr. Rosen ✓  
 Mr. Tracy ✓  
 Mr. Mohr ✓  
 Mr. Carson ✓  
 Mr. Hendon ✓  
 Mr. Mumford ✓  
 Mr. Jones ✓  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓  
 Tele. Room  
 Mr. Nease  
 Miss Beahm  
 Miss Gandy

b6

b7C

b7D

indicated to [redacted] that he had learned the following information through a confidential informant, the identity of which [redacted] believes to be [redacted]

warfare. (S)

b1

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be forwarded to the Internal Security Section and that they contact key field offices and have them confidentially contact their informants with a view to developing any information along these lines.

SWB:mrh

Classified by SP805/col

Declassify on: OADR 3-8-88

#259494

RECORDED &amp; INDEXED

34 SEP 9 1947

EX-30

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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 OTHERWISE.

100-93216-1  
 100-93216-1  
 100-93216-1  
 100-93216-1

DECLASSIFIED BY: 6032/SP805/col  
 DATE: 11/11/2000

700-93215-1264

100-93216-126X2 (U)

INDEXED

SAC, New York

October 9, 1947

Director, FBI

RUSSIAN WAR PLANS

7/21/04  
CLASSIFIED E 60267 uc/nls/bja/pam  
DECLASSIFY ON: E.O. 117/21/2029

EX-81

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

You are requested to expedite this inquiry and advise the Bureau of the results of your investigation.

[Redacted]

b1

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

San Francisco

Los Angeles ED 11

Chicago

Oct 10 1947 P.M.

Boston

Washington Field

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

EHM:WMJ:TD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE.

Classified by SP8 BTJ/cul  
Declassify on: OADR 3-8-88  
259,494

SECRET

Handwritten signatures and initials, including "EAG" and "JAC".

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Ladd *SL*  
 FROM : J. P. Coyne *JP*  
 SUBJECT: ~~RUSSIAN WAR PLANS~~  
 INTERNAL SECURITY - R *EW*

DATE: October 15, 1947

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Reference is made to a previous memorandum submitted to you by [redacted] regarding the captioned matter, which indicated that during the time [redacted] was in Los Angeles an unknown woman had furnished information to the effect that Russia had produced a more potent weapon than the atom bomb.

b6

b7C

[redacted] memorandum indicated this information had been obtained from [redacted]. The information furnished in [redacted] memorandum was forwarded to the Los Angeles Office. That Office was advised that further efforts would be made through the original informant to identify the unknown woman.

On October 13, 1947, Special Agent [redacted] of the Liaison Section advised that [redacted] told him the original informant in this case was [redacted]

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[redacted] be contacted directly regarding this matter. [redacted]

[redacted] had furnished this information to the FBI. [redacted] might be able to identify the unknown woman.

## ACTION:

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b7D

There is attached hereto for your approval a letter to the San Diego Office instructing them to contact [redacted] and secure from him the desired information. It should be noted that [redacted] is well known to the Special Agent in Charge of the San Diego Office.

Attachment

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
 OTHERWISE.

FJB:EW

RECORDED

INDEXED

IF IB II

b6

b7C

Classified by *SP8BJC/CL*  
 Declassify on: OADR 3-8-88  
 #239,494

DECLASSIFIED BY *60247 uclmshg/fm*  
 ON 7-21-2004

~~SECRET~~

@Bartolozzi and Hayfey *SL*

SAC, San Diego

Director, FBI

October 16, 1947

HUNGARIAN WAR PLANS

INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Classified by 252474  
Declassify on: OADR 3888

RECORDED

100-93216-126X3(3)(u)

[Redacted]

b1

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

[Redacted] has now advised the Bureau's Liaison Section that [Redacted] originally furnished the information to him and he has suggested that [Redacted] could possibly identify the unknown woman referred to above. He also stated that it would be all right to tell [Redacted] that he furnished this information to the Bureau.

b6

b7C

b7D

I would like to have you call upon [Redacted] and endeavor to ascertain the identity of this unidentified woman and secure any additional information known to him regarding this instance.

[Redacted]

(S)

INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN

OTHERWISE

b1

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

100-93216-126X3

WML

G.I.R.

Handwritten signatures and initials.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: October 20, 1947

FROM : SAC, Chicago

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN WAR PLANS

Rebulet October 9 last to the New York Office.

A check of informants on Communist and Russian matters in this territory has been made regarding ~~Soviet~~ bacteriological warfare with negative results. An effort was also made to determine whether any scientists, physicians, chemists, pharmacists, or bacteriologists who are members of the Communist Party have been conducting research in bacteriology. No information has been received concerning this.

This office will continue to be alert for information of this type and the Bureau will be furnished any data coming to the attention of this office.

WLR:MAS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 UC/NLS/bja/pma

RECORDED

INDEXED

21 OCT 22 1947

b6

b7C

Bacteriological Warfare

241

OCT 20 1947

64-114

100-93216-126X1

100-93216-126X1

F B I



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON ENVELOPE  
~~ONLY HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 uc/nd/jg/pan

100-93216-127

*Chk*

*0 Bacterial Air face*

*ch*

Lab. File destroyed Date

*9/11/45*

☒ tains

☒ original evidence

☒ work sheet

*513*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON ENVELOPE  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE *7-21-04* BY *60329 UC/NW/BJA/PAK*

51 OCT 4 1945

*100-73216*

*78W*

Recorded  
10-1-43  
VMK

L-40

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Laboratory Work Sheet

Re: Laboratory Examination of wooden top  
bullets.

File # 100-93216  
Lab. # CH-2569

Examination requested by: Norfolk

Date of reference communication: 9-29-43 Let

Date received: 9-30-43 VMK

Examination requested: Miscellaneous (Bacteriological)

Result of Examination: Examination by: White

Specimens submitted for examination

Q1. Six wooden topped bullets

*Consumed*  
2 cart. gaugs to be retained  
in firearm collection from photo  
b6  
b7C  
Recd 10-9-43 VMK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 UC/MS/bj/PM

*Please file*

100-93216-131

10-15-43

b6

NOTARY PUBLIC

PHOTOCOPIES

b7C

October 28th, 1947

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,  
Federal Bureau Investigation,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Probably you have thought of this matter before but it still might be of some interest to you. Of course I know of your work during the war with stamps in detecting slight changes to carry messages and the sending of messages under the punctuation marks in letter.

That got me to considering the possibility of spreading pestilences by means of cultures of most virulent bacteria and spores under valuable stamps sent from, for instance USSR. I have made cultures on Petri dishes from stamps soaked off envelopes and found about everything in the line of bacteria and spores.

Stamps are usually soaked off the envelope with warm water and this whole thing could spread contagion over the whole country in short order. Of course the people could be advised to soak off the stamps in bactericidal solution.

Just an idea but it might 'pan dirt'.

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ack 11-3-47  
2000

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60262 uc/nuc/bj/pau 26

RECORDED  
INDEXED

NOV 5 1947

EX-14

DAY OR NIGHT BY APPOINTMENT

Bacterial Warfare

November 1, 1947

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Dear [REDACTED]

RECORDED  
INDEXED  
Your letter dated October 28, 1947, has been received and I do want to thank you for the patriotic motives which prompted you to write as you did. It occurred to me that you might like to read the material which I have enclosed.

EX-14

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Enclosure

How To Fight Communism

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-21-2007 BY 60267 uc/nw/bja/pme

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 10 20 5

★ NOV 3 1947 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 11/6/47

FROM : SAC, San Diego

SUBJECT: ~~X~~ RUSSIAN WAR PLANS  
INTERNAL SECURITY - RALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE.

Rebulet October 16, 1947.

At the request of this office [redacted] personally con-  
tacted the informant who furnished him with [redacted] referred to in refer-  
ence letter. [redacted] informant advised [redacted]

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[redacted] will advise [redacted] at once upon  
ascertaining any such information and the General will immediately contact  
this office.

Confidential informants of this office on Russian and Communist  
matters were contacted in regard to any similar statements of this nature  
and none had any information that such statements had been made in this  
vicinity. (S) (X) (U)

Informants have also advised that there are no scientists, physicians,  
chemists, pharmacists or bacteriologists who are members of the local Com-  
munist Party and that to their knowledge no Party member in this area is pre-  
sently engaged in research in bacteriology. (S) (X) (U)

The Bureau will be immediately advised upon receipt of any further  
information regarding the captioned matter. In the meantime this matter is  
being referred upon completion to the office of origin.

Classified by SPBBTJ/CAL  
Declassify on: OADR 3-8-88  
# 259,494

NSH:EWJ  
100-6867

cc-Los Angeles

b1

RECORDED (U)  
&  
INDEXED  
102  
F B I  
37 NOV 18 1947  
100-23216-128

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/MLG/PAK  
ON 7-21-2000

53 NOV 29 1947

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~~SECRET~~

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice

New York, New York

Mr. Tolson.....  
Mr. E. A. Tamm.....  
Mr. Clegg.....  
Mr. Glavin.....  
Mr. Ladd.....  
Mr. Nichols.....  
Mr. Rosen.....  
Mr. Tracy.....  
Mr. Egan.....  
Mr. Gurnea.....  
Mr. Harbo.....  
Mr. Mohr.....  
Mr. Pennington.....  
Mr. Quinn Tamm.....  
Mr. Nease.....  
Miss Gandy.....

DATE: 7-21-2004

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NO3/bj/PAU

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3 1 7-21-2029

November 7, 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director, FBI

Re: ~~RUSSIAN WAR PLANS;~~  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter of October 9, 1947, captioned, RUSSIAN WAR PLANS, requesting that information be obtained concerning members of the Communist Party who may be engaged in Bacteriological Research.

Informants and other sources available to the New York office have furnished the following information.

[redacted] on October 17, 1947, advised  
Special Agent [redacted] that in the recent past [redacted]

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

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Reference is made to letter to the Director dated December 4, 1946 from New York, captioned, "COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A., DISTRICT No. 2, NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION", which sets forth information reported by [redacted] concerning [redacted] allegedly a Communist Party member; one

JMS:MFB  
100-80472

RECORDED  
&  
INDEXED

100-93216-128X1

NOV 12 1947

317  
68 NOV 29 1947

~~SECRET~~

125 b6  
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[redacted]



~~SECRET~~

Letter-Director  
JMS:MFB  
100-80472

November 7, 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

According to [redacted]

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The files of the New York Office reflect that [redacted]

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b7C  
in 1944 as being active members of the Northwest Section, Communist Party, in Los Angeles. Concerning [redacted] the files of the New York Office reflect no information which could be identified with this person. The files of this office reflect that the name [redacted] appeared on the 1942 membership list of the AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS and on the mailing list of the NEW YORK CONFERENCE FOR INALIENABLE RIGHTS.

In a recent interview with Agent [redacted] advised that he would attempt to obtain more identifying data concerning [redacted]

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It has also been learned through informants and other sources that the American Association of Scientific Workers and the Association of New York Scientists, and other individuals have recently evidenced interest in bacteriological warfare.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Letter-Director  
JMS:MFB  
100-80472

November 7, 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The "News Letter", published by ANYS, dated August 25, 1947, made available by an informant of the New York Office, contains a paragraph captioned, "Bombs, Bacteria, and Peace", which sets forth the results of a discussion held by Dr. THEODOR ROSEBURY concerning biological warfare, concerning which it is stated it might be comparable to atomic energy as a weapon of mass destruction. A resolution was adopted by ANYS that "The UN efforts toward international control of weapons of mass destruction be supported, strengthened, and extended to include, not only atomic bombs, but biological warfare as well." (see X page 4)

Two photostatic copies of the aforementioned "News Letter" are enclosed for the Bureau.

On October 24, 1947, there appeared in the New York Herald Tribune, a lengthy article by PETER KIHSS concerning bacterial warfare which reflects that, on September 26, 1947, Dr. HARRY GRUNDFEST and Dr. MAURICE B. VISSCHER submitted to the United Nations General Assembly on behalf of the AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS, a bacterial warfare memorandum proposing that the Assembly instruct the UN Atomic Energy Commission to devote part of its time to the problem of bacterial warfare which the AASW considers "the pre-eminent terror weapon". The Tribune article reflects that Dr. IGNACY ZLOTOWSKI, Polish delegate to the NAEC considered the memorandum to be of great significance. (see y p4)

Two photostatic copies of the Herald Tribune article are enclosed for the Bureau.

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b7C [ ] contacts with [ ] have been reported to the Bureau in connection with current investigations of [ ] which are being conducted currently by the New York Office.

WALTER WINCHELL, during his broadcast Sunday evening, October 12, 1947, and printed in his column in the New York Daily Mirror on October 14, 1947, discussed Russia's preparation for World War III. Concerning biological warfare, WINCHELL stated, "The Communists have germ warfare already..... Every resource in the Communist Party has been converted to war. The Russians have developed germ warfare. The cholera plague in Egypt is suspect abroad of

~~SECRET~~

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Letter-Director  
JMS:MFB  
100-80472

November 7, 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"being a Soviet experiment. There are some very suspicious things about that plague in Egypt although no positive evidence either way."

Concerning WINCHELL's comments on germ warfare, there appeared in the New York Times of October 9, 1947 a letter to the editor submitted by THEODOR ROSEBURY and ELVIN A. KABAT which comments on WINCHELL's "cholera" statement and refers to a "detailed report on bacterial warfare written in 1942 and published this year in the May issue of the Journal of Immunology."

Two copies of the ROSEBURY-KABAT letter to the Times are enclosed herewith for the Bureau.

The files of the New York Office reflect that [redacted] are both interested in bacteriology [redacted]

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[redacted] They have in the past identified themselves with pro-Communist and pro-Russian movements though they are not known to be members of the Communist Party. They were both members of the American-Soviet Science Society which featured free exchange of scientific information between American and Soviet scientists in all fields.

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[redacted] in April, 1944, was reported by a highly confidential source of the Newark Office as being a member of the Communist Party. [redacted] interest in the field of bacterial warfare is apparent. Investigation has revealed him to be pro-Communist and pro-Russian. [redacted]

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Confidential Informants have advised that [redacted] has also recently evidenced interest in bacterial warfare [redacted]

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[redacted] is not known to be a member of the Communist Party, but files of this office reflect that she is pro-Communist and pro-Russian.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Letter-Director  
JMS:MFB  
100-80472

November 7, 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It is to be noted that on October 15, 1947, [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] in-  
formed [redacted]

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The Baltimore Office, by letter to the Director, October 23, 1947, reported the portions of WALLACE's speech that were concerned with bacterial warfare.

Concerning the efforts of the ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS and the ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK SCIENTISTS and other individuals to influence the UN AEC to consider bacterial warfare along with atomic energy, [redacted]

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[redacted] of the Washington Field Office and [redacted] a Confiden- (S)  
tial Informant of the New York Office, have stated that [redacted]

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Concerning [redacted] mentioned in Bureau letter of October 9, 1947, the New York Office has thus far received no information from its sources as to the identity of the woman who allegedly made the statement regarding the "Soviet weapon".

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The Bureau will be advised immediately upon receipt of information to be obtained by [redacted]

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Very truly yours,

*Edward Scheidt*  
EDWARD SCHEIDT, SAC

CC: Los Angeles

Enclosures for Bureau (6)

~~SECRET~~

## **Claim Disputed of Experiment to Induce Cholera Outbreak**

*The writers of the following letter, co-authors of the report on bacterial warfare recently made public, are associate professor and assistant professor, respectively, at Columbia University's College of Physicians and Surgeons.*

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

A well-known radio commentator, in his broadcast on Sunday, Oct. 12, made the following statement:

"The Russians have developed germ warfare. The cholera plague in Egypt is suspected abroad of being a Soviet experiment. There are some very suspicious things about that plague in Egypt, although there's no positive evidence either way."

In a detailed report on bacterial warfare written in 1942 and published this year in the May issue of *The Journal of Immunology*, the undersigned pointed out that cholera "may probably be dismissed as unsuitable" for warfare. We gave reasons for this statement which are as valid today as they were in 1942.

We do not know the sources of any of the radio commentator's remarks on germ warfare. Our published statements indicate that any nation attempting such warfare would be likely to choose agents other than that of cholera. If an "experimental" attack were to be launched, it would hardly be done in such a way as to attract world-wide attention, as the cholera outbreak in Egypt was sure to do, and if actual warfare were intended it would not be likely to appear as an isolated attack in a relatively unimportant quarter.

One of the focal difficulties in bacterial warfare—one of its many aspects that make elimination of these weapons urgently necessary for maintenance of peace in the world—is the problem of distinguishing between natural and artificially induced outbreaks of disease. The radio commentator chose a poor example; but there is grave danger that on other occasions ugly rumors may be circulated which will be equally baseless but less easy to scotch. Is every unusual outbreak of disease in every politically troubled spot on earth to be called bacterial warfare?

THEODOR ROSEBURY,

ELVIN A. KABAT.

New York, Oct. 16, 1947.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12/14/04 BY 60267uc/jm/34  
3

# The U. N. Yesterday

Friday, Oct. 3, 1947

## Scientists Warn Assembly on Bacterial Warfare; Belgian Premier Replies to Slav States on Balkans

**WARFARE**—Warning that weapons of bacterial warfare can be manufactured in any country, irrespective of size or wealth, the American Association of Scientific Workers appealed to the United Nations General Assembly for immediate study to eliminate what it called "the pre-eminent terror weapon." The United States delegation reserved comment, but Poland planned to raise the issue in the Atomic Energy Commission. Story on this page.



freedom of information on its own controlled press. Speaking in the assembly's social, humanitarian and cultural committee, the former first lady said that a Soviet request for the 1948 U. N. freedom of information conference in Geneva to base its work on such principles as the exposure of warmongers would be like describing black in order to define white. Story on this page.

**LOVE**—Canada charged that the Soviet Union is breaking up the happy home life of a Canadian diplomat and a Moscow ballerina, and called for action by the U. N.'s Human Rights

## Scientists Ask Germ-Warfare Study by U. N.

### U. S. Group Asserts Single Laboratory Could Spread Tremendous Destruction

By Peter Kihss

**LAKE SUCCESS, L. I., Oct. 3.**—The United Nations, unable thus far to agree on controlling atomic energy, has received a fervent appeal from American scientists to start immediate study of bacterial warfare, which the scientists called "the pre-eminent terror weapon."

In a memorandum which listed eleven forms of disease already investigated for possible use in warfare against humans, animals and plants, the American Association of Scientific Workers, representing 1,500 members, pointed out that a single small laboratory could manufacture enough germs to spread death on a tremendous scale.

A milliliter—an amount that would have to be measured by dropper—of a routine preparation of parrot-fever virus contains enough material, the scientists wrote, to infect 20,000,000 humans with the deadly disease. Ordinary virus laboratories, their memorandum added, could make thousands of milliliters with only common equipment and materials.

### Ask Assembly Inquiry

The American scientists simply asked the General Assembly to undertake a preliminary examination of available factual data and listed 148 references in both general and technical literature. They proposed that the Assembly then instruct the U. N. Atomic Energy Commission to devote at least part of its time to the problem.

United States delegates have called attention to the bacterial-warfare problem in scientific documents submitted to the commission, whose field embraces elimination of all mass-destruction weapons. Today they reserved comment on the new memorandum. Their position heretofore has been that the commission should concentrate first on atomic energy, where control of uranium and thorium ores makes possible a relatively simpler technological control.

Dr. Ignacy Zlotowski, Polish member of the commission, considered the new memorandum of great significance. Dr. Zlotowski said he would ask the commission to discuss the issue at its next session, which remains to be called by the new chairman, Dr. T. F. Tsiang, of China.

### Would Ban Mass Weapons

Agreeing that the bacterial-warfare field offers unprecedentedly difficult problems of control, Dr. Zlotowski asserted, its very existence demonstrates "it is absolutely necessary to have as a first step the immediate prohibition of weapons of mass destruction."

The bacterial-warfare memorandum was submitted Sept. 26 to Secretary General Trygve Lie and delegates of the then fifty-five members of the Assembly. Signing the covering letter were Dr. Maurice B. Visscher, association president who is chief of the physiology department at the University of Minnesota, and Dr. Harry Grundfest, international corresponding secretary, who is assistant professor of neurology at the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons.

The new memorandum pointed out that, although bacterial warfare has never been used in a military operation, it was under investigation and development by both Germany and Japan. It recalled that a report to Robert P. Patterson, then Secretary of War, on results of joint American-British-Canadian research declared on Jan. 3, 1946 that "this type of warfare cannot be discounted."

Among diseases known to have been investigated in the recent war for purposes of bacterial warfare, the report listed botulism, anthrax, rabbit fever, undulant fever, glanders, parrot fever, rinderpest, Newcastle disease of poultry, fowl plague, fungous diseases of plants and synthetic hormone poisoning of plants.

100-93216-128X1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12/14/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB

FF 977600



## Bombs, Bacteria and Peace Clearance & Declassification

*Bombs, Bacteria and Peace* was the topic of a membership meeting of the ANYS on August 5. Dr. Theodor Rosebury, senior author of the Rosebury-Kabat Report and later group leader at Camp Dietrich, discussed the potentialities of disease-producing organisms as military weapons. Although he admitted that the effectiveness of biological warfare could not be demonstrated with certainty prior to its actual use in a war which we all hope will never come, Dr. Rosebury indicated the serious potentialities of such use. He went on to point out that work on viruses and bacterial agents is carried out in hospitals and laboratories all over the world and that production of dangerous quantities could be effected without employing such large scale equipment as is necessary for the production of dangerous amounts of fissionable material. Therefore, biological warfare does not lend itself to the type of technical controls which offer some promise for removing the danger of atomic warfare, and the problem of biological warfare becomes even more obviously the problem of the elimination of war.

Dr. Irving Kaplan of the Brookhaven National Laboratory and the ANYS Executive Council, reviewed current developments in the UNAEC and stressed the establishment of effective control of atomic energy as an important step toward the prevention of war; failure to attain effective control would be a severe set-back.

Discussion from the floor centered around biological warfare and the possibility that it might be comparable to atomic energy as a weapon of mass destruction. The following resolution was adopted unanimously: Resolved that "The UN efforts toward international control of weapons of mass destruction be supported, strengthened, and extended to include not only atomic bombs but biological warfare as well."

### MILITARY CONTROL IS NOT DEAD

When the long struggle of civilian versus military control of atomic energy culminated in the passage of the McMahon Bill, many scientists felt that the domestic problem was settled and that they could henceforth devote their full efforts to the problems of international control. Unfortunately, reports from Washington indicate that military control is far from dead. Several bills have been introduced with the intention of repealing the McMahon Bill and turning control of atomic energy over to the Army outright. Although there does not appear to be any likelihood that these measures will be passed at present, we are warned to expect serious trouble when the McMahon Bill comes up for renewal in 1948. So long as people continue to think of atomic energy as a military weapon and a national monopoly, so long will the ANYS and similar groups have a problem of domestic education which must not be neglected.

The present situation with regard to clearance of employees of the Atomic Energy Commission was discussed at some length during the Council Meeting of the Federation of American Scientists on August 9 and 10. Several cases have arisen in which decision with regard to clearance of persons have been delayed for six months or more after they had resigned from former positions in the expectation that they could be hired immediately. Whether the final decision in such a case is one of acceptance or rejection, there is no excuse for so much delay during which a man can neither carry out useful work nor receive any remuneration.

Other cases are known in which employment has been refused or terminated for reasons which were either trivial or ridiculous. The Association of Cornell Scientists is undertaking a documented study of those cases on which it can get definite information. If you know of any case of inefficiency or injustice in clearance, please notify Dr. Robert S. Rochlin, Dept. of Physics, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

The Council also discussed the present unsatisfactory situation of declassification of report. The original directives as to material to be classified and declassified left a large region in which decision is left to the discretion of the reviewer and several cases of confusion and inconsistency have resulted.

## National Science Legislation

As readers are undoubtedly aware, a bill creating a National Science Foundation has been passed by both houses of Congress and vetoed by the President. The bill as originally passed by the Senate contained two amendments; one which provided for presidential appointment for distribution of 25% of the funds to state-supported institutions according to a fixed pattern. Neither amendment was included in the bill as passed by the House, and both amendments were stricken out by the joint conference committee. President Truman vetoed the bill not because he was opposed to a Science Foundation but because the bill as passed created an agency directly responsible neither to the President nor to Congress. Apparently much of the objection to the administrative set-up came from the Bureau of the Budget which opposed the precedent of an agency in which the Government was without control over the allocation of funds. Discussion of this situation at the recent Council meeting of the FAS indicated that probably no other bill will be passed before the next presidential election. It was also emphasized that the President had shown no real leadership in the matter and had waited until the bill was reported out onto the floor before he indicated what types of legislation would and would not be acceptable to the Administration. It appears that the President has no scientific adviser in his circle of intimates.

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**  
**United States Department of Justice**  
Los Angeles 13, California  
November 8, 1947.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/mw/bp/pan  
ON 7.21.2004

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Re: ~~RUSSIAN WAR PLANS~~  
INTERNAL SECURITY-R

Mr. Tolson .....  
Mr. E. A. Tamm .....  
Mr. Clegg .....  
Mr. Glavin .....  
Mr. Ladd .....  
Mr. Nichols .....  
Mr. Rosen .....  
Mr. Tracy .....  
Mr. Egan .....  
Mr. Gurnea .....  
Mr. Harbo .....  
Mr. Mohr .....  
Mr. Quinn Tamm .....  
Mr. Nease .....  
Miss Gandy .....

Dear Sir:

Reurlets of October 9 and 16, 1947.

~~CONF. INFO.~~

[redacted] who is familiar with Russian activities in the Los Angeles Field Division advised that he has no knowledge concerning the war plans of the Russian Government nor has he heard any comment concerning warfare developments of the Russians from any Russian individuals with whom he is acquainted in the Los Angeles area. He further advised that he knows of no scientists, physicians, chemists or bacteriologists who are of Russian extraction who have been conducting any research in the field of bacteriology in this area.

~~CONF. INFO.~~

[redacted] advised that they have not heard anything concerning possible Russian war developments from any Communist source. Neither informant is aware that any scientist, chemist or bacteriologist in the Los Angeles area who might be affiliated with the Communist Party is presently conducting any research in the field of bacteriology. No comment has been heard by either informant from any Communist Party member indicating that any research in bacteriological warfare or other type of warfare is being conducted by any Communist Party member in this area.

[redacted] has explained that on several occasions [redacted]

~~CONF. INFO.~~

[redacted] were also contacted by this office for any possible information concerning the Russian war plans with negative results.

52 NOV 29 1947

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&  
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37 NOV 11 1947

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


Director, FBI

Re: RUSSIAN WAR PLANS,  
INTERNAL SECURITY-R.

November 8, 1947

Confidential informants of this office who were contacted concerning possible knowledge of Russian war plans have been requested to convey any information which they might receive concerning these plans immediately to this office. The Bureau will be advised immediately upon the receipt of any information relating to Russian war plans which this office receives.

Very truly yours,

  
R. B. HOOD,  
SAC

JMC:MAW

100-23580

DECLASSIFIED BY 60217 UC/NLS/bja/PAK  
ON 7-21-2004

Director, FBI

12/11/47

SAC, Boston

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C;  
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R  
REFER 5-1B

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reference is made to Boston letter to the Bureau dated December 3  
last and to Bureau teletype to Boston captioned [REDACTED]  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R," dated December 5 last. u

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The following information has been received from the informants  
indicated concerning the subject matter of the two communications referenced. u

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] (U)

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cc: New York  
M.G. each  
100-2081  
cc: 100-16404  
100-21396

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CLASS. & EXT. BY SP5 P.D.H.  
REASON FOR EXT. 1-2.4.2, 2  
DATE OF REVIEW 9-26-90  
CLASS. ON 9-26-90

RECORDED

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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director from SAC, Boston

12/11/47

Re: AASOW; IS-C  
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE, IS-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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~~(U)~~

The meeting was held at the Littauer Center [redacted]

[redacted] the following were also present at the public meeting: Dr. HARLOW SHAPLEY, LAWRENCE ARGUMENT (both subjects of pending Internal Security investigations in Boston), CARL GUTAG of the Biology Department at Harvard, and one ALBERT HARRIS, [redacted]

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b7C  
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[redacted] The total attendance in the informant's estimate was between 150 and 200. [redacted]



~~(U)~~

ROSEBURY was introduced by FURRY and began his talk with a general discussion of the various types of bacteria which would be used in bacteriological warfare. He emphasized particularly sitotoxin, rabbit fever, the bubonic germ, and tetanus. He emphasized particularly that tetanus was one virus which could be used effectively in a war which was hard to control but which, in turn, was easily disseminated and quickly effective. He then

X

Director from SAC, Boston

12/11/47

Re: AASOW; IS-C  
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE, IS-B

approached the problem from the standpoint that bacteriological warfare was a much more desirable means to an end than atomic warfare, inasmuch as with BW, human life is destroyed but not property. Thus the conquering nation using bacteriological warfare is enabled to take over a physically sound plant without the usual problems connected with prisoners of war or other human elements. X (u)

HARLOW SHAPLEY arose from the audience at this time to interrupt the speaker with his own comment. SHAPLEY pointed out that ROSEBURY was underestimating the situation, inasmuch as in these times, warring nations are not interested in whether or not property or human life is destroyed. The sole aim of a warring nation is to eliminate a competing factor on the face of the earth. Accordingly, a nation such as the United States would not care whether or not the physical facilities of an enemy were left intact upon the completion of a victorious war or not so long as the disrupting force in the American ideal had been eliminated. X (u)

ROSEBURY also expressed regret at the failure of the United States and Russia to reach a political accord and warned that the entire world could be devastated in any future war. He felt that the United States proposals on the control of atomic energy were inadequate and that the United States foreign policy left little chance for peace. He expressed the hope that a new administration, a complete reversal of foreign policy, and a new approach to international problems involving Russia would find us facing many, many years of peace. X (u)

The main thesis of ROSEBURY's talk was then developed. He urged those present, and particularly the membership of the Boston-Cambridge Branch of the American Association of Scientific Workers to exert pressure through the creation of public opinion upon the United Nations so that this agency might take the necessary steps to establish international control of biological warfare. The informant points out that this thesis is one well known to most of the scientists through the work of the New York Chapter of the AASOW in filing with Dr. IGNACE ZLOTONSKI, Polish Delegate to the UN Commission on Atomic Energy, a copy of the ROSEBURY-KABAT report with the request that the Commission of which ZLOTONSKI is a member take steps to establish international controls. The informant noted that ROSEBURY did not suggest any particular method of international control or, for that matter, of national control of information concerned with BW. X (u)

In the question period which followed, an unidentified individual asked ROSEBURY whether or not the Russians had competent bacteriologists who could develop the germs and cultures which he had so vividly described. ROSEBURY stated that there were such men, and delved briefly into the history

Director from SAC, Boston

12/11/47

Re: AASOW, IS-C  
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE, IS-R

of Russian science which, as explained by him, showed a strong background in this field. SHAPLEY arose to state that one of the common misconceptions about Russia was that the country lacked competent scientists. He wished to state of his own authority that Russia possessed competent scientists in not only this field but in many related fields. He received a number of requests to suggest proposals for the control of BW which he definitely brushed aside. (u)

Immediately following his platform appearance, ROSEBURY was interviewed in the presence of [ ] and others by a reporter from the BOSTON HERALD. The interview resulted in a front page story in the HERALD headlined "Scientists Refusing to Work on Arms, Says Dr. ROSEBURY." The interviewing reporter in his story declared that ROSEBURY had stated that scientific workers were no longer interested in doing research work on war problems. He stated that many of them had refused to work on BW projects and that in the atomic energy field, the Government was having difficulty finding competent physicists. He was surprised that the reporter was not conversant with this alleged fact. He was asked by the reporter in a series of lengthy and sharp questions, according to the informant, whether or not he would work again on BW if requested to by the Government. His answer, according to the informant, was accurately reported by the HERALD: "I don't think you have a right to ask me that question." He also made reference at this time and further on the platform to the fact that the Government's principal laboratories doing this work under the supervision of the War Department were located at Frederick, Maryland. (u)

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
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CONFIDENTIAL

Director from SAC, Boston

12/11/47

Re: AASOW, IS-C  
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE, IS-R



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b7D

~~(u)~~  
The Bureau's attention is directed to Boston letter to the Bureau dated November 29, 1947, captioned "RUSSIAN WAR PLANS, INTERNAL SECURITY - R." The foregoing material will constitute the suggested investigation in the last paragraph of that letter. ~~(u)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Director from SAC, Boston

12/11/47

Re: AASOW, IS-C  
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE, IS-R

Subsequent to the dictation of the foregoing, information was  
received from [redacted] on 12/10/47 that [redacted] Nb

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

*WUX* 20 1947

TELETYPE

BOSTON 2 FROM WASH 20 6-28 PM

SAC U R G E N T

RUSSIAN WAR PLANS, IS DASH R. REURLET OCTOBER NINE, NINETEEN  
FORTYSEVEN REGARDING MEMBERS OF CP ENGAGED IN BACTERIOLOGICAL  
RESEARCH. EXPEDITE RESULTS OF YOUR INQUIRIES.

HOOVER

END

W R 2 BS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60247 uc/nls/bja/pau

SAC, Boston

November 26, 1947

Director, FBI

RUSSIAN WAR PLANS

Re my letter dated October 9, 1947, in the captioned case.


W  
It is desired that you furnish the results of your inquiries as requested in my letter of October 9, 1947. This investigation should be expedited inasmuch as the War Department has requested the Bureau's assistance concerning this matter.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-84 BY 60267 ucl/nucl/bj/pam

RECORDED

100-23216-131  
F B I  
56 NOV 28 1947

BHM:eh



Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

71 DEC 3 1947

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
 FROM : SAC Boston  
 SUBJECT: ~~RUSSIAN WAR PLANS;~~  
 INTERNAL SECURITY - R

DATE: 11-29-47

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 uc/mud/bja/FAM

Reurlets 10-9-47 and 11-26-47 and teletype of 11-20-47 in the above-captioned case in which the Bureau requests this office to contact informants and Communists in Russian matters regarding a statement allegedly made by a woman in New York to the effect that "the Soviet Union has a weapon at least equal to the U. S. atom bomb."

Informants of the Boston Office have been unable to furnish any information with respect to the alleged statement of the woman in New York, nor have these informants been able to furnish much information regarding the identity of the scientists, physicians, chemists, pharmacists or bacteriologists who are members of the Communist Party who have been conducting research in bacteriology.

It is noted from a review of the files of the Boston Office that the New York Times of May 20, 1947 contains an editorial entitled, "Bacterial Warfare." This editorial gives credit to Doctors ~~THEODOR ROSEBURY~~ and ~~ELVIN A. KABAT~~ for having published the most comprehensive paper on bacterial warfare in print.

With respect to the problem of bacterial warfare the Boston Office notified the New York Office by letter dated August 6, 1947 under the caption of ~~American Association of Scientific Workers; IS-C~~ that ~~THEODOR ROSEBURY~~ delivered a lecture on biological warfare at the Marine Biological Laboratories, Woods Hole, Massachusetts, sometime prior to July 28, 1947 and points out that ~~ROSEBURY~~ released a report on biological warfare in May, 1947 under the auspices of the AAScW.

By letter dated April 5, 1947 the Boston Office forwarded to the Bureau under the caption, "AAScW; IS-C" a photostatic copy of the "News Letter of the AAScW" published at New York under date of October, 1947. This news letter contains an article, "Bacterial Warfare--An Infectious Route to Peace?"

The News Letter article on Bacterial Warfare refers to the report on "Bacterial Warfare" by ~~THEODOR ROSEBURY~~ and ~~ELVIN A. KABAT~~ which

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
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30 DEC 29 1947

Bacteriological Warfare

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98

G.I.R.



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[REDACTED]

According to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (phonetic), who has been identified by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and a member of the CPA in 1945 at [REDACTED]

On November 15, 1947 [REDACTED] provided the Boston Office with the results of a conversation between [REDACTED]

brought to public attention a weapon on which many governments have been performing extensive research in recent years. In referring to biological warfare the News Letter of the American Association of Scientific Workers, October 1947 issue, states, "the importance of this weapon (referring to biological warfare) may be judged from the facts that one fluid ounce of the virus of psittacosis (parrot fever), unconcentrated, contains enough to infect about a half billion humans and that this is only one of many such biological products, some of which can be dispersed in aerosols. Since all such bacterial agents of death can be produced in small biological laboratories by methods practically indistinguishable from those used in making disease-fighting preparations, control by international inspection is obviously not feasible."


11-29-47

Director, FBI

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CC-New York  
100-21198  
RWD:mad

The Boston Office will advise the Bureau regarding the results of the December 9, 1947 meeting which the Boston Office has been told will be held in order to discuss the problem of Biological Warfare. The Boston Office will, of course, keep the Bureau informed of any subsequent information coming to its attention regarding any activity on the part of scientific persons who are members of the Communist Party who may be or have been conducting research in bacteriology.



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*W. J. [unclear]*  
Director, FBI

11-29-47

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: December 1, 1947

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, San Francisco  
SUBJECT: ~~X~~RUSSIAN WAR PLANS

Reference is made to the letter from the Bureau dated October 9, 1947 wherein it is requested that this office contact informants on Communist and Russian matters for information bearing on statements allegedly made to [redacted] by a woman who arrived in Los Angeles from New York to the effect that "in the inner circles (Communist Party) the Soviet need no longer have any qualms about asserting itself, etc."

All confidential informants and sources of information on Communist and Russian matters in the San Francisco Field Office territory have been alerted for information bearing on the statements contained in referenced letter. These informants and sources have been instructed to be particularly alert to statements made regarding Soviet bacteriological warfare. As of this date these informants have been unable to furnish any pertinent information bearing on the aforementioned matter.

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WJM/es  
AIR MAIL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2007 BY 60362 uc/als/bjg/pkm

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*03 bacteriological warfare*

01 JAN 14 1948

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9-17-81 BY SP7MJS/BJ

JMS:ja  
100-12385

cc: Boston

The New York office considers this matter RUC'd to Boston by this letter.

"Journal of Immunology" published by Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore, Maryland. [redacted] mentioned in referenced Boston letter, is [redacted] of the [redacted]

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Inquiry by the New York Office has determined that [redacted] "IGNACY ZLOTOWSKI, INTERNAL SECURITY - R". [redacted] to the Bureau on November 8, 1947 in connection with the case entitled "Journal of Immunology". Photostatic copies of this article were forwarded was released for publication in 1947 and appeared in the May 1947 issue of [redacted] in 1942 wrote a report on Bacterial Warfare which [redacted]

[redacted] For the information of the Boston office [redacted]

The following appeared in the ED SULLIVAN's column in the "New York Daily News", December 20, 1947: "At Boston, University of Illinois proxy GEORGE D. STODARD said, 'Technology called national defense is mobilizing and monopolizing, U. S. scientists, who are afraid to decline'. Same day, at Cambridge, bacteriologist Dr. THEODORE ROSEBURY announced that U. S. scientists are flatly refusing to work on military developments, preferring fundamental research."

In this connection reference is made to the report of SA [redacted] New York, dated December 20, 1947 entitled, CINRAD, a copy of which has been furnished to Boston. This report on pages 6 and 7, sets forth information from the files of the New York office concerning [redacted]

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Reference is made to letter to the Director, December 3, 1947 from Boston, concerning the captioned matter, which requests the New York office to furnish Boston with a summary of derogatory information concerning [redacted]

REFER 5 IS

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C  
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

SAC, New York

Director, FBI

December 23, 1947



100-213763-415



Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

JAN 27 1948

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED  
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRCC)  
DATE: 7-14-83

EX-111


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Declassify on: OADR

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F.B.I.  
JAN 20 1948

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JAN 12 3 04 PM '48

The above information is being submitted to you for your information. A

(u)(c)



In connection with the captioned matter which was recently discussed with you by Special Agent [redacted] of this Bureau, the following additional information is set forth.

A confidential informant of this Bureau advised that [redacted]

Subject: [redacted]

Internal Security - R

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington 25, D. C.

Consultation Avenue

Department of the Navy

Chief of Naval Intelligence

Date: January 12, 1948

January 12, 1948

CONFIDENTIAL  
BY SPECIAL INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY 60247 ucl/hsl/bj/trau  
ON 7-21-2004

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*Confidential Unfiled*

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Clipping from  
P.M.  
pages 11  
1-13-48

File

Biological Warfare

**Report on Army Tests Reveals Germs as Powerful 'Terror Weapons'**  
By Albert Deutsch

While our physical scientists were working feverishly at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos and other centers to construct the atom bomb, groups of biological scientists were engrossed in experimental work at Camp Detrick, Maryland, with that other horrendous agent of annihilation - bacterial warfare, or BW for short. One of these groups worked with meticulous care on the development of deadly airborne bacteria and viruses, and on tests of their effect on laboratory animals.

The frightening results are described in cold, dull, technical terminology in a newly-published opus entitled *Experimental Air-Borne Infections*, published by the Society of American Bacteriologists. The senior author, Dr. Theodor Rosebury, of Columbia University, directed this particular Camp Detrick project. He is co-author, with Dr. Elvin A. Kabat, of the report on *Bacterial Warfare* that created a sensation some months ago.

The extraordinary thing about the new Rosebury book is that it never mentions bacterial warfare even once, although it describes in minute detail some of the laboratory experiments aimed primarily at perfecting bacterial agents of deliberate destruction.

So successful were the scientists that at the end of their experiments they were able to predict with deadly accuracy the exact dose of every effective bacterial agent required to infect or to kill a particular species of animal used in the laboratory. The Rosebury book contains tables giving the exact number of bacteria needed in a suspension or "cloud" to ensure "desired results." The Detrick experiments were incomplete, inasmuch as they naturally could not include results on the ultimate object of BW - man himself.

"We did not have a Hiroshima or a Nagasaki for bacterial warfare, thank God," Dr. Rosebury testily comments.

The book represents the first scientific work reporting quantitative methods of successfully spreading highly infectious bacteria and viruses by air routes, under far more precise controls than had ever been used before.

The Rosebury group at Camp Detrick (the Army's main chemical warfare center during the war) succeeded in stabilizing all but one of the highly infective bacterial agents they worked with. The main agents used were the bacteria producing brucellosis, glanders, melioidosis and tularemia. The Detrick BW experimenters also studied several virulent viruses producing psittacosis, or parrot disease.

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Deutsch

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 10471 ucjw/ajp/rlm

INDEXED  
Bacteriological Warfare  
Biological Warfare  
M. S. G. 11

The most highly effective bacterial agent proved to be tularemia, which produces in man a prostrating disease with prolonged disability, although most victims recover. The most deadly disease agent the experimenters used was the *bacillus Whitmorei*, which produces melioidosis, a rare disease in man apparently limited to the Malay Archipelago and surrounding areas in the Orient.

#### **'Terror' Angle Makes Effective BW Agent**

It is the very rarity of melioidosis that makes it a potentially terrible weapon of warfare. Of 95 recorded cases in man, only five are known to have survived, and in each of the latter the disease was of long duration. BW experts have been impressed by the fact, as Rosebury puts it in his earlier report on BW, that "it induces a highly fatal disease of man, it is foreign to the experience of most of the world, and may thus be said to epitomize the exotic terror with which the idea of bacterial warfare is invested in the popular mind."

The psittacosis virus, the Detrick experiments proved, has an amazing virulence. A single milliliter (about 16 drops or three-hundredths of an ounce) contains about 20,000,000 infective doses for man! Under conditions of laboratory control the psittacosis virus spread in cloud chambers was 18 per cent effective. Under uncontrolled conditions, even if only one-hundredth of one per cent were able to reach its victims, the results would be calamitous.

In spite of the highly infective and lethal bacteria and viruses handled by the Rosebury group at Camp Detrick over a two-year period, only one researcher was infected. This man was Dr. Rosebury himself, who came down with a case of psittacosis caused by inhaling viruses escaping from a leaking ampule. Rosebury was hospitalized for sixteen days, and was cured by doses of penicillin and sulfadiazine—the first psittacosis recovery definitely attributable to these chemotherapeutic agents. The victim, with the aid of his colleagues, very promptly utilized his own case to determine successfully the infective dose of psittacosis for man.

The BW experiments at Camp Detrick had extremely important results for the future of public health research. Methods were devised with great ingenuity for handling dangerous bacterial agents with perfect safety. Some of the safety methods have been incorporated in the new laboratory for research in infectious diseases built by the U. S. Public Health Service at Bethesda, Maryland. A number of drug companies have also duplicated these safety measures in their own laboratories. The Camp Detrick project in BW perfected measures for controlling quantitative and qualitative results of bacterial research that may produce rich rewards in the search for methods of combating air-borne disease germs, as well as for producing them.

# Report on Army Tests Reveals Germ as Powerful 'Terror Weapons'

By Albert Deutsch

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Spreading Infection**

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The frightening results are described in cold, dull, technical terminology in a newly-published opus entitled *Experimental Airborne Infections*, published by the Society of American Bacteriologists. The senior author, Dr. Theodor Rosebury, of Columbia University, directed this particular Camp Detrick project. He is co-author, with Dr. Elvin A. Kabat, of the report on *Bacterial Warfare* that created a sensation some months ago.



Deutsch

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Clipping from

P.M.

page 11

1-13-48

Mossberg

Blackburne W. Moore

X

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60 JAN 27 1948

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

JAN 19 1948 P.M.  
100-2363

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

According to this informant Hoesbury was introduced by Randall M. Perry, Assistant Professor of Physics at Harvard University and began his talk with a general discussion of the various types of bacteria which would be used in biological warfare. The informant stated that Dr. Hoesbury emphasized particularly early nitrotoxin, rabbit fever, the typhoid fever and tetanus. He emphasized that bacteria which could be used effectively in a warfare and which would be hard to control, but which in turn, could be easily destroyed and quickly effective. The informant advised that he then approached the problem from the standpoint that bacteriological warfare was a much more desirable to an end than atomic warfare inasmuch as with bacteriological warfare, the contamination is destroyed, but not properly. Thus, according to Dr. Hoesbury, the contamination is destroyed, but not properly. Thus, according to Dr. Hoesbury, the contamination is destroyed, but not properly. Thus, according to Dr. Hoesbury, the contamination is destroyed, but not properly.

Reference is made to my memorandum of December 16, 1947 concerning the captioned matter. You will recall that information was set forth in my memorandum that Dr. Theodor Hoesbury was scheduled to lecture on bacteriological warfare on December 9, 1947 under the sponsorship of the American Association of Scientific Workers. A confidential informant of this Bureau who has been reliable in the past, has now advised that Dr. Hoesbury recently gave the lecture referred to above at the Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. The total attendance at this meeting was estimated by the informant to have been between 150 and 200 persons.

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Subject: Bacteriological Warfare

Date: January 16, 1948  
To: Director of Intelligence  
Department of the Army General Staff  
The Pentagon  
Washington 25, D. C.  
Attention: Colonel L. H. Jerney, Chief, Security Group

AT SPECIAL MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 60277 uclw/lyb/ptm  
ON 9-21-2007

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According to this informant, in the question period that followed Dr. Nosobury's lecture, an unidentified individual asked Dr. Nosobury whether or not the Russians had competent bacteriologists who could develop the germs and cultures which he had described. Dr. Nosobury stated that there were such men and devoted a strong background in this field. According to the informant, Harlow Shapley again arose to state that one of the common misconceptions about Russia was that that country lacked competent scientists. The informant advised that Shapley stated that he knew that Russia possessed competent scientists in not only this field, but in many related fields. According to the informant, Shapley received a number of requests at that time to suggest proposals for the control of

national control of information concerned with bacteriological warfare. suggest any particular method of international control or, for that matter, of control of biological warfare. The informant noted that Dr. Nosobury did not state that this agency might take the necessary steps to establish international control of biological warfare. The informant noted that Dr. Nosobury did not exert pressure through the creation of public opinion upon the United Nations so Boston-Cambridge branch of the American Association of Scientific Workers to then developed. He urged those present and particularly the membership of the

According to the informant, the main thesis of Dr. Nosobury's talk was that the United States and Russia to reach a political accord and warned that the entire world could be devastated in any future war. According to the informant, Dr. Nosobury stated that he felt that the United States' proposals on the control of atomic energy were inadequate and that the United States' foreign policy left little chance for peace. Dr. Nosobury expressed the hope that a new administration, a complete reversal of foreign policy, and a new approach to international problems involving Russia would find us facing many years of peace.


The informant said that Dr. Nosobury expressed regret at the failure of the United States and Russia to reach a political accord and warned that the entire world could be devastated in any future war. According to the informant, Dr. Nosobury stated that he felt that the United States' proposals on the control of atomic energy were inadequate and that the United States' foreign policy left little chance for peace. Dr. Nosobury expressed the hope that a new administration, a complete reversal of foreign policy, and a new approach to international problems involving Russia would find us facing many years of peace.

The informant stated that Dr. Harlow Shapley, Director of the Harvard Observatory, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., arose from the audience at that point in Dr. Nosobury's lecture to interrupt the speaker with his own comment. The informant stated that Shapley pointed out that Dr. Nosobury was underestimating the situation inasmuch as in these times warring nations were not interested in whether or not property or human life was destroyed. Shapley stated that the sole aim of a warring nation was to eliminate a competing factor on the face of the earth. According to the informant, Shapley said that a nation such as the United States would not care whether the physical facilities of an enemy were left intact upon the completion of a victorious war so long as the disrupting force in the American ideal had been eliminated.

CONFIDENTIAL

The above data is submitted to you for your information and any action you may desire to take. You will be kept currently advised of information received by this Bureau concerning the captioned matter.

(S)



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The informant stated that following the meeting

Department were located at Frederick, Maryland. (S) work in connection with bacteriological warfare under the supervision of the war with the reporter to the fact that the government's principal laboratories doing The informant advised that Dr. Rosebury also made reference during his conversation Boston Herald newspaper: "I don't think you have a right to ask me that question". Government. His answer according to the informant was accurately reported by the or not he would work on bacteriological warfare if requested by the United States bury was asked by the newspaper reporter in a series of lengthy questions, whether conversant with this alleged fact. According to the Bureau's informant, Dr. Rose- The article reflected that Dr. Rosebury was surprised that the reporter was not energy field, the government was having difficulty finding competent physicians had refused to work on bacteriological warfare projects and that in the atomic interested in doing research work on war problems. He stated that many of them story declared that Dr. Rosebury had stated that scientific workers were no longer refusing to work on arms, says Dr. Rosebury". The interviewing reporter in his This interview resulted in a front page story in this newspaper headlined "Scientists appearance, he was interviewed by a reporter from the Boston Herald newspaper. The informant advised that immediately following Dr. Rosebury's platform

bacteriological warfare which he brushed aside.



# Report on Army Tests Reveals Germs as Powerful 'Terror Weapons'

By Albert Deutsch

While our physical scientists were working feverishly at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos and other centers to construct the atom bomb, groups of biological scientists were engrossed in experimental work at Camp Detrick, Maryland with that other

horrendous agent of annihilation—bacterial warfare, or BW for short. One of these groups worked with meticulous care on the development of deadly airborne bacteria and viruses, and on tests of their effect on laboratory animals.

The frightening results are described in cold, dull, technical terminology in a newly-published opus entitled *Experimental Air-Borne Infections*, published by the Society of American Bacteriologists. The senior author, Dr. Theodor Rosebury, of Columbia University, directed this particular Camp Detrick project. He is co-author, with Dr. Elvin A. Kabat, of the report on *Bacterial Warfare* that created a sensation some months ago.



Deutsch

The extraordinary thing about the new Rosebury book is that it never mentions bacterial warfare even once, although it describes in minute detail some of the laboratory experiments aimed primarily at perfecting bacterial agents of deliberate destruction.

## Remarkable Success in Spreading Infection

The book represents the first scientific work reporting quantitative methods of successfully spreading highly infectious bacteria and viruses by air routes, under far more precise controls than had ever been used before.

The Rosebury group at Camp Detrick (the Army's main chemical warfare center during the war) succeeded in stabilizing all but one of the highly infective bacterial agents they worked with. The main agents used were the bacteria producing brucellosis, glanders, melioidosis and tularemia. The Detrick BW experimenters also studied several virulent viruses producing psittacosis, or parrot disease.

So successful were the scientists that at the end of their experiments they were able to predict with deadly accuracy the exact dose of every effective bacterial agent required to infect or to kill a particular species of animal used in the laboratory. The Rosebury book contains tables giving the exact number of bacteria needed in a suspension or "cloud" to ensure "desired results." The Detrick experiments were incomplete, inasmuch as they naturally could not include results on the ultimate object of BW—man himself. "We did not have a Hiroshima or a Nagasaki for bacterial warfare, thank God," Dr. Rosebury tersely comments.

It is the very rarity of melioidosis that makes it a potentially terrible weapon of warfare. Of 95 recorded cases in man, only five are known to have survived, and in each of the latter the disease was of long duration. BW experts have been impressed by the fact, as Rosebury puts it in his earlier report on BW, that "it induces a highly fatal disease of man, it is foreign to the experience of most of the world, and may thus be said to epitomize the exotic terror with which the idea of bacterial warfare is invested in the popular mind." The psittacosis virus, the Detrick experimenters proved, has an amazing virulence. A single milliliter (about 16 drops or three-hundredths of an ounce) contains about 20,000,000 infective doses for man! Under conditions of laboratory control, the psittacosis virus spread in cloud chambers was 18 per cent effective. Under uncontrolled conditions, even if only one-hundredth of one per cent were able to reach its victims, the results would be calamitous.

In spite of the highly infective and lethal bacteria and viruses handled by the Rosebury group at Camp Detrick over a two-year period, only one researcher was infected. This man was Dr. Rosebury himself, who came down with a case of psittacosis caused by inhaling viruses escaping from a leaking ampule. Rosebury was hospitalized for sixteen days, and was cured by doses of penicillin and sulfadiazine—the first psittacosis recovery definitely attributable to these chemotherapeutic agents. The victim, with the aid of his colleagues, very promptly utilized his own case to determine successfully the infective dose of psittacosis for man.

The BW experiments at Camp Detrick had extremely important results for the future of public health research. Methods were devised with great ingenuity for handling dangerous bacterial agents with perfect safety. Some of the safety methods have been incorporated in the new laboratory for research in infectious diseases built by the U. S. Public Health Service at Bethesda, Maryland. A number of drug companies have also duplicated these safety measures in their own laboratories. The Camp Detrick project in BW and qualitative results of bacterial research that may produce rich rewards in the search for methods of combating air-borne disease germs, as well as for producing them.

The most highly effective bacterial agent proved to be tularemia, which produces in man a prostrating disease with prolonged disability, although most victims recover. The most deadly disease agent the experimenters used was the *bacillus anthracis*, which produces melioidosis, a rare disease in man apparently limited to the Malay Archipelago and surrounding areas in the Orient.


## 'Terror' Angle Makes Effective BW Agent

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60367 JEL/MSH/PA/STW

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JMS:els  
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INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - R

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100-93216-132

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cc: Boston - 1 Encl.

cc: San Francisco - 3 Encls.

5 Encls.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

EDWARD SCHMIDT  
SAC

DECLASSIFIED BY 10227 ucl/vj/bj/ra  
ON 7-21-2004

Very truly yours,

This has been called to your attention in order that consideration may be given to the aforementioned information in the report is contemplated.

The attention of the Bureau and offices receiving this letter is directed to the fact that some of the information in the enclosed report was obtained from technical informants and particularly that some of the material concerns [redacted] former Vice-President HENRY WALLACE. Enclosed are copies of the report of SA [redacted] dated 12/20/47 at New York entitled CIRMAD.

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Dear Sir:

RE: CIRMAD  
INTERNAL SECURITY (R)

Director, FBI

December 20, 1947

New York, New York

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100-190625-2151-

100-190625-2151-  
James

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No 1  
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **SAN FRANCISCO** FILE NO. **100-47345**

REPORT MADE AT <b>NEW YORK</b>		DATE WHEN MADE <b>12/20/47</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>9/8-12/15/47</b>	REPORT MADE BY <div></div>
TITLE <b>CHAMBER</b>		CHARACTER OF CASE <b>INTERNAL SECURITY - R</b>		

DECLASSIFIED BY **6067 Jue/ust/gh/1004** ON **4-21-2004**

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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APPROVED AND FORWARDED:	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
COPIES OF THIS REPORT		ENCLOSURE
1 - Bureau 3 - San Francisco 1 - Boston (Info) 1 - New York		RECORDED 100-93216-138 52 FEB 2 1948 INITIALS ON ORIGINAL = 8

[Redacted]

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On May 17, 1947, [Redacted] with Confidential Informant [Redacted]

[Redacted]

On April 23, 1947, shortly after [Redacted] Confidential Informant [Redacted] advised [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Investigation of [Redacted] had not developed the exact source from which [Redacted]

Investigation by the Bureau revealed that though the article was discussed at the meeting, the word "testimony" had not been mentioned nor had it appeared in the article. The Atomic Energy Commission has advised that the word "testimony" is not objectionable but it associated with Atomic Energy Commission weapon research is objectionable from a security standpoint.

In the minutes for the February 1st meeting, [Redacted] commenting on an article by former Assistant Secretary of War JOHN J. McCLELLAN in the "Century Journal", referred to a "testimony bond" as being the object of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) research.

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subsequent to a general meeting of the FAS held at New York City on February 1 and 2, 1947, and the minutes of the meeting were distributed amongst member groups of the FAS.

DR. WILMA HEWITT FORTNEY

DETAILS:

Report of SA [Redacted] 2/8/47, New York.

REFERENCE: Bureau File 100-190625

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NY 100-47363

the GEORXIO plan encourages this viewpoint. development and control of atomic energy can proceed. The points are that the use of atomic energy is distinct and opposite applications. the advancement of the world, and the atom bomb as a

van KINCK's article also reflects that atomic energy for the development of atomic energy, again within the framework of a hand for this immediate and initial task. Therefore comes the cooperative of great nations by the great powers, is fundamentally the instrument at the Security Council of the United Nations maintaining all its principles for international agreement with proper provision for enforcement in which with the United States, as its sole possession, being the lead in calling punishing those who use the bomb. Rather the bomb must be eliminated energy for peace cannot be developed by the authority charged with creation cannot be diverted by, control, of the bomb and that atomic danger of world destruction, nevertheless does not recognize that the "The RAND report, while explaining in highly dramatic terms the to the RAND plan of the United States. She wrote in part as follows: GEORXIO plan for control of atomic energy by the United Nations as opposed In her article van KINCK supports the view of the Russian

at the Commodore Hotel, New York City on June 17, 1947. under the auspices of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship address van KINCK delivered at an assembly on American-Soviet relations International Cooperation". The article indicates that it is based upon issues of "Atomic Energy Today" captioned "Atomic Energy - Opportunity for This individual wrote an article appearing in the August 1947

# MARK VAN KINCK

Washington Center July 30, 1941 under the sponsorship of "New Nations". as a speaker on the program "The World Against Hitler", held at the stating that RAND REPORT, newspaper and military analyst, would appear in 1941. The July 26, 1941 issue of the Daily Worker contains an article his name appeared on the mailing list of the American Peace Mobilization Concerning [redacted] the files of the New York Office reflect that

[redacted]

NY 100-47363

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[redacted]  
[redacted] Confidential Informant  
[redacted] furnished by [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6 b7C It is pointed out that [redacted] is the subject of a current investigation being conducted by the New York Office. Additionally information concerning him is set forth later in this report.

The newspaper article further states that Dr. IGNAZ SZLOMOWSKI, Polish member of the UNRWA, considered the new committee to be of great significance and that he was asked that he would ask the Committee to discuss the issue at its next session. SZLOMOWSKI asserted that the very existence of the kind of bacterial warfare demonstrated "the absolutely necessary to have as a first step the immediate prohibition of weapons of mass destruction".

On October 4, 1967 there appeared in the New York Herald Tribune newspaper a lengthy article by RUTH KINGS, reporting that HARRY GRUNWISZ and MAURICE VILKIN, on behalf of the ALBET, had submitted to the United Nations General Assembly on September 26, 1967 a memorandum concerning bacterial warfare. The cover letter signed by GRUNWISZ and VI SCHEN (National President of the ALBET) requested that the General Assembly undertake a preliminary examination of available factual data and proposed that the Assembly instruct the UNRWA to devote part of its time to the problem of bacterial warfare, "the present danger to the world". The memorandum lists eleven forms of disease already investigated for possible use in warfare against humans, animals and plants, and pointed out that a single small laboratory could manufacture enough germs to spread death on a tremendous scale.

It is to be noted that Dr. HARRY GRUNWISZ is the international corresponding secretary of the New York branch of the American Association of Bacteriologic Workers, in which organization he is very active.

**Dr. HARRY GRUNWISZ and  
The Association of Bacteriologic Workers**

b2 b6 b7C b7D That [redacted] has been a frequent contributor to "Soviet Russia Today", a pro-Russian periodical. She has been and is a member of numerous local and national Communist front organizations. Confidential Informant [redacted] advised an agent of the New York Office that [redacted] to be a member of the Communist Party.

NY 100-47343

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Confidential Informant

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (made available by Confidential Informant)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] advised on October 31, 1947 that

Confidential Informant

**ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK SCIENTISTS**

It is to be noted that to date there has been no indication that the aforementioned dinner has been held or that further plans for it have been arranged.

[Redacted]

Confidential Informant [Redacted] on October 27, 1947, advised that

[Redacted]

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NY 100-47343



the [redacted] the American-Soviet Physics Society, Inc.

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NY 100-47343

Confidential Informant [redacted] advised that THEODORE ROSENBERG, during the summer of 1947, had delivered a lecture on biological warfare at the Marine Biological Laboratories, Woods Hole, Massachusetts [redacted]

On November 15, 1947 Confidential Informant [redacted]

advised that [redacted]

[redacted]

Confidential Informant [redacted] has identified [redacted] of the Program Committee of the Boston-Cambridge Branch of the ALBON for 1947-1948.

Confidential Informant [redacted] advised on December 3, 1947 that ROSENBERG would deliver his lecture on biological warfare at the new lecture hall at Harvard University under the sponsorship of the Boston-Cambridge Chapter of the ALBON. It is to be noted, as indicated previously in this report, that in reference to ROSENBERG's discussion on biological warfare at an ALBON meeting on August 25, 1947, Washington Field Informant [redacted] and Confidential Informant [redacted] of the New York Office reported that [redacted]

Confidential Informant [redacted] has advised that [redacted] recent past has been in contact frequently with [redacted] concerning [redacted] and nothing at [redacted] a subjective nature to report.

[redacted] also advised on August 14, 1947 that [redacted]

Confidential Informant [redacted] advised on October 9, 1947 [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Informants [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted] THE INFORMANTS DID NOT KNOW, HOWEVER, WHERE  
[Redacted]  
On October 10, 1967 the same informant advised [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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NY 100-47343

One copy of this report has been designated for the Boston Office inasmuch as it contains information of interest to that office, particularly in connection with the activities of the American Association of Scientific Workers.

Will continue to report pertinent information developed in connection with this case in accordance with Bureau Bulletin 579, dated October 15, 1947, and in accordance with instructions concerning COMINT as set forth in SAC letter 7164, dated December 16, 1947.

AT NEW YORK CITY

NEW YORK DIVISION

WVW

NY 100-47363

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] who has requested that his identity be kept confidential.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Confidential informants mentioned in the report of SA [Redacted] dated December 20, 1947 at New York, are as follows:

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CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

NY 100-47343

60 FEB 14 1948

EHM:mer

Tolson  
E. A. Tamm  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Harbo  
Mohr  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

100-190625

CC: Boston

MAILED  
DUPLICATE  
YELLOW

The Boston Office is requested to review its file concerning [redacted] and to furnish its information to the New York Office.

From a review of the information in the Bureau's files regarding [redacted] it is believed desirable that the New York Office should institute an investigation of [redacted] in order to determine his activities. It is noted that he is a member of the American Association of Scientific Workers and is in frequent contact with numerous scientists suspected of pro-Communist and pro-Russian activities in the New York Field Office territory. You are instructed to review the files of your Office regarding [redacted] and to submit the pertinent information concerning him in the first investigative report emanating from your Office.

In connection with the material contained in the referenced report relating to bacteriological warfare you are instructed to include such information in the future under the caption "Bacteriological Warfare."

Reference is made to the report of Special Agent [redacted] dated December 20, 1947, at New York, New York, in the case entitled "Cinrad, Internal Security - R." A review of this report reflects that it has not been prepared pursuant to the latest Bureau instructions. In regard to the section of this report captioned [redacted] your attention is directed to SAC letter No. 164, Series 1947, dated December 16, 1947. The information received by your Office relating to the subject matter referred to in this letter should be reported in letter or report form under the caption [redacted] Internal Security - R.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7-21-2007 BY 60322 uc/us/gj/brm

INTERNAL SECURITY - R  
[redacted]  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R  
CINRAD

Director, FBI  
100-190625-152

SAC, New York

January 27, 1948

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INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

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100-80472

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Investigation has revealed that [redacted] and [redacted]

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The New York indices contain no reference to the [redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] was unable to furnish any additional information concern-  
ing the location of [redacted]. However, in this connection reference  
is made to page 38 of the report of SA [redacted] dated June 24, 1947, at  
New York, entitled [redacted] was; INTERNAL SECURITY - R, which  
reflects that a highly confidential source made available to the New York  
Office in March, 1947, [redacted]

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Concerning the [redacted] allegedly a Communist Party member  
and [redacted] advised that this individual is [redacted]  
[redacted] membership in the Communist Party at Los  
Angeles has been set forth in referenced letter.

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The indices of the New York Office contain no reference to  
the BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES, INC., and do not reflect any information concern-  
ing [redacted] other than that set forth in reference letter.

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[redacted]  
This informant recently advised SA [redacted] that [redacted]

Reference New York letter dated November 7, 1947, concerning  
information made available by Confidential Informant [redacted]

RUSSIAN WAR PLANE  
SOVIET WAR PLANE  
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

SAC, New York

Director, FBI

February 7, 1948

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60327 JLG/US/bp/PRW

NY 100-80472  
Letter to the Director

Information obtained concerning him during the course of investigation tends to reflect that he is pro-Russian. He is not known to have been engaged in bacteriological research.

The files of the New York Office reflect that Dr. WILLIAM MARIAS MATISOFF, who until his recent death was the subject of an INTERNAL SECURITY - R investigation by the New York Office, had conducted considerable research with the BOGOMOLITZ sera.

Concerning [redacted] the files of the New York Office reflect that Confidential Informant [redacted] in May, 1943, reported that [redacted]

The New York files also reflect that [redacted] was born in New York City on March 10, 1909. He was closely associated with [redacted] with aliases, subject of an INTERNAL SECURITY - R investigation by the New York Office. On several occasions he was in contact with [redacted] in this case reflected that [redacted] There is no indication, however, that [redacted] is or was engaged in biological or bacteriological research.

In an effort to determine whether any known members of the Communist Party were known to be engaged in biological or bacteriological research, the following confidential informants have also been contacted with negative results:

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No additional information is available in the New York Office at the present time concerning members of the Communist Party who are known to be engaged in research in biology and bacteriology. Therefore this matter is being placed in a closed status by this office. However, in the event pertinent information is received in the future, the Bureau will be advised.

Investigation to date does not reflect that he is engaged in biological research. [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] to date reflects that [redacted]  
[redacted] had been opened in the New York Office concerning [redacted] and investigation for Soviet intelligence on research on biological warfare. A separate case [redacted] of New York City, a "Communist Party member . . . works [redacted] reported to the New York Office by an informant to the effect that [redacted] January 5, 1948, entitled "SOVIET WAR PLANS" which contains information re-  
Reference is made to New York teletype to the Bureau dated

NY 100-80472  
Letter to the Director

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. E.A. Tamm

~~SECRET~~

DATE: February 26, 1948

FROM : D.M. Ladd

**SUBJECT:** BIOLOGICAL WARFARE  
b6 [REDACTED] (Phonetic)

CLASSIFIED BY UC/NUS/bia/2004 60267  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 7-21-2029

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Beahm  
Miss Gandy

b7C

[redacted] Naval Intelligence, came to my office on February 25, 1948, at 3:30 p.m.

[redacted] stated that has been in touch with [redacted] (phonetic).  
a leading scientist working on biological warfare at [redacted].

[redacted] reportedly stated that no other scientist knows the type of work he is doing at [redacted] [redacted] stated that when he talked to [redacted]

the latter advised him that there is presently a move on among scientists for the purpose of throwing the whole biological warfare information obtained to date open to all scientists. [redacted] is very much concerned

with the disastrous effects that this type of warfare could have on civilization generally. Because of this concern, [redacted] wanted to furnish information he has concerning biological warfare to counter-intelligence agencies of this Government.

[redacted] stated that he came to me and intends to go to the Intelligence Division of the Army and CIA for the purpose of sending a representative to a meeting at which [redacted] will furnish information regarding biological warfare. [redacted] further stated that when definite plans for this meeting are made he would advise me.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

It is recommended that [redacted] of the Laboratory be designated to represent this Bureau at the meeting to be addressed by [redacted]

**JFD:hp**

100-93216-104  
62-19253-1048

59 MAR 25 1948

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NMS/bjlpam  
ON 11-1-2004  
Obj, I, OCA 10-25-2004  
60267 UC/NMS/bjlpam 11-1-2004

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : E. A. TAMM

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

DATE: March 1, 1948

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Beahm  
Miss Gandy

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I don't think a Bureau representative should attend any meeting addressed by [redacted] on the subject of biological warfare. There is bound to be publicity about such a meeting, and I think it would be well if the Bureau were not involved in this publicity.

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[redacted] has been in touch with the Bureau from time to time on a very casual basis through the suggestion of [redacted]. From these contacts we know that the work which [redacted] is doing is not of interest to the Bureau, and I do not think, consequently, that we should be involved in any way in this situation.

EAT:FA

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9 agree ✓  
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ONE  
was informed in  
accordance with  
above 3/19/48  
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MAR 22 1948

59 MAR 25 1948

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: March 15, 1948

FROM : SAC, New York

SUBJECT: ~~SOVIET WAR PLANS~~  
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Enclosed is an article from the March 5, 1948 issue of the ~~"Brooklyn Eagle"~~ (New York) which reflects a statement made by Dr. VINCENT P. MAZZOLA of New York charging that German scientists are working with the Russians toward the perfection of bacteriological methods of offense and that the Soviet Union would prefer to conquer this nation by germ warfare rather than use atomic or cosmic ray weapons.

The article also reflects that Dr. MAZZOLA demanded that sufficient funds be appropriated for agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, intimating that this would be a method of combatting Communism.

This is furnished for the Bureau's information.

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ENC. (1) TO BUREAU

NEW YORK FILE #100-80472

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\* BROOKLYN EAGLE

# Charges Russia Girds For Germ War on U. S.

The Soviet Union would prefer to conquer this nation by germ warfare rather than use atomic or cosmic ray weapons, Dr. Vincent P. Mazzola, gynecologist at St. Peter's and Long Island College Hospital, declared last night.

Charging that a great many German scientists—"and maybe Hitler himself"—are working with the Russians behind the Iron Curtain toward perfection of bacteriological methods of offense, Dr. Mazzola told a meeting of the Catholic Action Institute at St. Vincent's Home for Boys, 66 Boerum Place, that Stalin, in any attempt at invasion of the United States, would wish to preserve its edifices and industrial plants.

Atomic and cosmic ray weapons, he pointed out, would demolish the very structures invading armies would wish to save.

Dr. Mazzola was the first of four weekly speakers scheduled to address the institute which

has been organized by the Kings County Chapter, Catholic War Veterans, "for the information and guidance" of C. W. V. members and their families.

"This is the hour," Dr. Mazzola said, for international solidarity of all peoples possessing a moral rather than a materialistic philosophy; bipartisan action and support to preserve freedom and to "crush Red-Fascist fifth column activities."

Demanding that sufficient funds be appropriated for agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, he added that a prime weapon against communism would be to enable the individual worker to earn enough to "support his family well."

The Rev. Charles J. Bermel, county chaplain of the C. W. V., outlined the purpose of the series of lectures.

Allan F. Matthews, first county vice commander, presided.

Subjects of the next three classes, scheduled for March 11, 18 and April 1, respectively, are "Charity—the Motivating Force of Catholic Action"; "Catholic War Veterans, Their Families, and What Part They Play in Catholicism and Catholic Action," and "Practical Catholicism and Catholic Action."

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CLIPPING FROM THE  
Brooklyn Eagle  
N. Y.  
MAR 5 1948  
DATED  
FORWARDED BY N. Y. DIVISION



Director, FBI

March 12, 1948

SAC, New York

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Enclosed is an article from the March 6, 1948 issue of the "New York Herald Tribune" which is concerned with a statement made by RICHARD L. WEISS of the Federation of American Scientists relative to biological warfare.

This is furnished to the Bureau and Washington Field for information purposes.

Enc. (1) filed with original  
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DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267UC/NUS/bja/PMA

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29 MAR 22 1948

① Biological Warfare

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

1 April 1948

Dear Mr. Ladd:

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With reference to the attached memorandum, [redacted] advises me that you will not be able to send representatives to this meeting. I very much hope you will reconsider your decision since it is my belief that the sessions will be beneficial to all agencies. I feel that the subject of the meeting is so important from a counter-intelligence viewpoint that it will require the concerted efforts of all Federal agencies to cope with it. As you know, these will be merely exploratory sessions which will not commit any agency to any course of action. We would appreciate having the benefit of your comments in the light of FBI's broad experience in the field of counter-intelligence.

Sincerely,

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DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 UCL/MSL/gj/ram

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April 12, 1948

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EX-138

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

Department of the Navy  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear [Redacted]

Mr. Ladd has brought to my attention your memorandum to him dated April 1, 1948, inviting him to nominate two representatives of this Bureau to attend a small conference being called at the Office of Naval Intelligence to explore the counterintelligence phases of bacteriological warfare.

The subject of this contemplated meeting is of great importance, and I feel that representatives of this Bureau should participate in this conference.

I have designated Special Agent [Redacted] and [Redacted] Scientific Chief of the FBI Laboratory, to participate in this conference scheduled for a period of one week beginning April 19, 1948.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 ucl/nsl/bp/pai  
ON 7-21-2004

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- Tolson
- E. A. Tamm
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

MAY 10 1948

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
MAILED 6  
APR 13 1948 P.M.  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

3/15  
J. Edgar Hoover

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: April 22, 1948

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONFERENCE AT THE  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DURING THE WEEK  
OF April 19, 1948

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Holmes  
Miss Gandy

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the more technical information supplied by [ ] as given by him to the captioned conference, which was attended by Special Agents [ ]

As pointed out in previous memoranda concerning this matter, [ ] purpose in talking to the conference was to present Bacteriological Warfare as an instrument of sabotage and psychological warfare which, in his opinion, could far surpass in serious effects on the security of the country the normal type of sabotage. [ ] qualified himself by stating that BW as an instrumentality of sabotage is, in his estimation, the most serious in time of peace since the use of BW in actual warfare is an entirely different matter.

It is observed that it is believed [ ] concern over the use of BW as a sabotage instrumentality is brought about by virtue of the experiments he has conducted at [ ] as well as the developments accomplished there in this field. While it cannot be stated as a fact, it is believed beyond a reasonable doubt, that [ ] is being subsidized by the Navy to develop BW.

Recent Developments in BW Described by [ ]

[ ] prior to outlining a hypothetical master plan of sabotage through the use of BW, gave a brief talk on what he has developed at [ ] and what in turn are the potential uses of these developments.

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Observations

As stated previously, it is believed that [ ] concern in this matter is the result of what his experiments have shown and his thinking as to the potential use of BW as a sabotage instrument. With this in mind, [ ] has pointed out that he feels it to be of the utmost necessity that representatives of the various intelligence agencies are acquainted with the subject matter (not to a great scientific degree, however), and that they in turn coordinate and correlate information developed by them. In this regard it is to be noted that, of course, when the Bureau develops information of an intelligence character in this field it is made available to the interested intelligence agencies. However, it is to be observed that the armed forces in their program of the use of BW as an offensive measure, have not seen fit to advise the Bureau. This may be because of the character of the classification given to information, or it may be that the intelligence agencies of the armed forces feel that it is strictly a matter of offensive warfare.

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The next meeting, and that will presumably be the last, will be, as you know, on Friday, April 23, 1948. At this time the report [ ] was requested to write for the conference will be obtained together with the consensus of observations and suggestions made by the conference with respect to the possible setting up of a coordinating committee or board in this matter.

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Director, FBI

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE AS A SABOTAGE MEDIUM

37 100-93216-145

During the week of April 19, 1948, at the invitation of the Office of Naval Intelligence, representatives of this Bureau attended a series of conferences at which the potential use of bacteriological warfare as a sabotage medium was discussed. Present at this conference were representatives from the Office of Naval Intelligence, Intelligence Division of the Army, Army Air Force Intelligence, as well as medical doctors attached to the Intelligence Department of the Army and the Office of Naval Intelligence. The conference was instigated by [redacted] of the Office of Naval Intelligence, who enlisted the services, as a sort of advisor and lecturer, of [redacted]

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[redacted] has emphatically requested that his name not be identified with the conference outside of the agencies or departments represented. Consequently, I am obliged to point out to you the extremely confidential character of [redacted] appear in Washington, D. C., for this purpose.

It was the purpose of [redacted] to [redacted]

[redacted]

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Representatives of this Bureau made no commitments in this regard.

The preventive, educational aspect of the proposed coordinating board or committee, it was observed at the conference, would undoubtedly involve such civilian agencies as the Public Health Service, the

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Pennington  
Quinn Tamm  
Nease  
Candy

EHW:aop

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DATE 4-29-48  
BY [signature]

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Department of Agriculture, United States Customs, and possibly other agencies which might have an indirect interest. Over and above this, it is conceivable that such a committee would have to take steps to educate certain persons within these agencies in bacteriological warfare and possibly at some ultimate time draw upon them for assistance or advice. This aspect in turn raises the question of the declassification of bacteriological warfare which is regarded in the Department of Defense as "~~top secret~~." Such a declassification would, of course, be strictly within the purview of the Department of Defense or within the hands of the President and his Cabinet.

In addition to the foregoing considerations there is the matter of appropriations to assist such a committee in carrying out its functions. This aspect too would require action on a higher ~~policy-making~~ plane than the ~~one~~ represented at the conference. In a similar vein, the power or authority to make requests of such civilian agencies as are described above is an aspect which would of necessity have to be granted on at least a Cabinet level.

The foregoing information and observations have been outlined for your consideration. I wanted to advise you of this as well as of the fact that this Bureau is not planning to take any action looking toward either the recommending of the establishment of such a planning committee or the actual establishment of it. This position is being taken since it is not felt that the FBI has the authority to initiate such action and further because the Office of Naval Intelligence having initiated the series of conferences could in turn take the initiative to carry the matter to a higher policy-making level. In this regard, it should be pointed out that while no commitments were made by representatives of the Naval Intelligence, it was indicated that they might possibly bring up these considerations at a future meeting of the National Security Council. The Army Air Force Intelligence representative in turn indicated that he felt that the problem should be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This Bureau will, of course, use to its best advantage the information obtained at the series of conferences which pertains to the intelligence and counterintelligence aspect of bacteriological warfare as a sabotage medium.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: April 24, 1948

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONFERENCE AT THE  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DURING THE  
WEEK OF APRIL 19, 1948

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

On April 23, 1948, Special Agents [redacted]

[redacted] attended the third meeting of the captioned conference.

Also present were [redacted] Army Air

Force Intelligence; [redacted] ONI; [redacted] ONI; Dr.

[redacted] It is believed that this will be the last of the conferences in this matter.

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The original purpose in having the report prepared was that it be used to acquaint the superiors of the representatives of the various intelligence agencies present with the potentialities of BW. A question, however, arose as to the dissemination to various branches of the Army and Navy of the material in [redacted] report as it stands inasmuch as some of the material concerns ~~Top Secret~~ classified data. This, however, has no effect on the Bureau's transmittal of it to the field. However, it was decided that [redacted] of ONI would have the statement changed to eliminate certain ~~Top Secret~~ material and to lower the classification to ~~Secret~~. It was requested by [redacted] that the material which is attached not be disseminated by the Bureau and that it only be brought to your attention at this time and until such time as the new draft is made available to the Bureau.

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It will be recalled that the second purpose of the April 23, 1948 conference was to obtain the observations and possible suggestions of the Intelligence Agency representatives present with regard to this matter. At the outset in these conferences, it was suggested by [redacted] with the implied agreement of ONI, that there be a coordinating board or committee set up to not only study intelligence and counterintelligence involving BW, but also to handle a preventive and educational type program. This original suggestion, however, has now taken a back seat since, as it was observed, representatives from ONI, G-2, and the Air Force soon admitted that the conference had no power to recommend the establishment of such a board and, furthermore, that the ramifications in setting up such a board were those to be handled on a top policy-making level. Of course, the FBI was at no time

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committed in these suggestions or in the matter of making recommendations. It might be noted that the representative of CIA who attended the initial meeting, [redacted], did not attend the two succeeding conferences. No explanation was given for his absence. It is observed that although CIA apparently has an interest in the intelligence and counterintelligence aspect of BW, they have not seen fit to be represented at all sessions.

It seemed to be the unanimous opinion of the Armed Forces Intelligence representatives that there is an important question of declassifying information concerning BW in the event a preventive or educational program should be undertaken since it would involve the supplying of certain information to such civilian agencies as the Public Health Service, Department of Agriculture, Customs, and possibly other agencies which might have an indirect interest. It was further recognized that none of the Intelligence agencies present would have the authority or could establish policy to request such civilian agencies to perform functions in this field.

Originally, [redacted] stated that he intended to present this problem to the National Security Council at its next meeting. He then changed his position and said that he thought he would present the problem in an attempt to obtain discussion on it. He was asked if he planned to refer to the preventive and educational aspect of the problem and he said he could not commit himself on that at the present. It was stated by [redacted] that he felt this problem should be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It was generally agreed that the representatives present would present [redacted] paper to their superiors for information purposes and for such action as would be considered desirable. It was agreed that BW used as a sabotage medium is a potential threat and that it, of course, warranted investigative attention by the various Intelligence Agencies within their respective jurisdictions. It might be noted that [redacted] of ONI made the suggestion that the respective agencies prepare monographs of information appearing in their files for the use of one another. It was observed by the FBI representatives, with the agreement of [redacted] that [redacted] paper represents merely a hypothetical situation and that a monograph centered around it might fall short of the desired purpose. This observation was made since there are conceivably other aspects which have not been considered by [redacted] and it was then agreed that monographs would not be prepared.

It is to be noted that [redacted] has promised to submit to ONI a detailed report or summary which will serve to fill out and document his attached report. ONI agreed to furnish a copy of this report to the Bureau, which, in all probability, will be of informative value to its Laboratory. It might also be noted that [redacted] talked privately with Special Agents [redacted] at which time he supplied information concerning [redacted] both of whom are identified with the left-wing American Association of Scientific Workers. Generally, this

data concerns the activity of these two in furthering what [ ] thinks

b6 [ ]  
b7C [ ] It will be noted that this is one of the steps  
b7D outlined in the hypothetical master plan of attack, as prepared by [ ]  
The information concerning [ ] is being made the subject of  
a separate memorandum for possible investigative use.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is not believed the Bureau should institute any program looking toward prevention or even education with regard to this problem of BW. Furthermore, it is recommended that the Bureau not initiate any attempt to take the matter to a higher policy-making level. This recommendation is made since the Navy itself has initiated these series of conferences and, consequently, it can take the initiative to carry the matter of establishing a coordinating board or committee to a higher policy-making level.

b6 [ ] 2. It is recommended that after the revised draft of [ ]  
b7C [ ] report is received from ONI, that an SAC letter be directed to  
b7D the field advising them generally of the potentialities in the use of BW as a sabotage instrument. Such a letter could also outline broadly the hypothetical plan to use BW as a sabotage medium. It could also point out that Communist Scientists and Soviet or satellite Nationals who could possibly engage in this activity, be considered for immediate apprehension in the event of the outbreak of hostilities.

Enclosure



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

**SUBJECT:** BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
 FROM : GUY HOTTEL, SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD

DATE: April 15, 1949

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SUBJECT: (S) **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE**  
**ESPIONAGE - R**

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 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Re Bureau letter dated March 14, 1949.

In connection with the above captioned matter, it is desired  
 to bring to your attention information received from confidential informant  
[redacted] whose identity is known to the Bureau.

Informant advised that [redacted]

It is felt that the above information will be of interest to  
 the Bureau at this time.

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Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/18/49

SAC, Louisville

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INTERNAL SECURITY - R - CZ

① *Biological Warfare*

By letter dated March 1, 1949 in the case entitled "Czechoslovakian Intelligence Activities in the United States, Internal Security R & CZ", Washington Field Office furnished information from confidential source [ ] concerning [ ]

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[ ] being "non political", but out of sympathy with the communist regime in Czechoslovakia.

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Washington Field

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[redacted]  
[redacted] wrote several articles on Czechoslovakia for a Louisville newspaper, and has several other articles on Czechoslovakia in proof.

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[redacted]  
A photograph was obtained and is being furnished to the Newark Office.

[redacted] was primarily a scientist and as such is not deeply interested in politics. [redacted]

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This information is being furnished to the Bureau, Newark and Washington Field Offices for possible future reference or use in case [redacted] name again appears.

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*2*

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**  
**United States Department of Justice**  
422 Federal Office Building, Civic Center  
San Francisco 2, California  
April 15, 1949

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Director, FBI

RE:

(S) [REDACTED]  
(BIOLOGICAL WARFARE)

b1

Dear Sir:

Remylet 3/30/49, and specifically to that section which  
contains information pertaining to former [REDACTED]

On 4/13/49, [REDACTED] was contacted, at which time he  
advised that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

In view of the fact that [REDACTED] will undoubtedly accept  
a position in the very near future, it is requested that the Bureau advise  
immediately if it desires that any action be taken by this office with  
regard to the Biological Warfare Program and specifically if an approach  
should be made to [REDACTED]

Very truly yours,

REGISTERED MAIL:  
Return Receipt Requested

52 JUN 9 1949

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HARRY M. KIMBALL  
Special Agent in Charge

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

DATE: May 16, 1949

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. Clegg ✓  
Mr. Glavin ✓  
Mr. Ladd ✓  
Mr. Nichols ✓  
Mr. Rosen ✓  
Mr. Tracy ✓  
Mr. Egan ✓  
Mr. Gurnea ✓  
Mr. Harbo ✓  
Mr. Mohr ✓  
Mr. Pennington ✓  
Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓  
Tele. Room ✓  
Mr. Nease ✓  
Miss Holmes ✓  
Miss Gandy ✓

PURPOSE:

To inform you of the results of the fourth conference held by the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to biological warfare in an unconventional attack by enemies of this country. This meeting was held at the Pentagon Building on April 30, 1949, and was attended by the regular committee and by [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency, and [redacted] Department of the Army, who were described in the minutes of the meeting as observers. (The files are presently being reviewed on these two persons and you will be furnished with any pertinent information concerning them.) To also inform you of the results of a contact with [redacted] by Bureau liaison representative.

BACKGROUND:

You will note that this is the Committee which was set up by [redacted] with the approval of [redacted] of the National Military Establishment to study various methods of unconventional methods of warfare. In connection with this program [redacted] has reportedly secured the assistance of [redacted] I have previously furnished you with memoranda in this matter reflecting that certain members of the Committee are at least questionable from a loyalty standpoint.

RESULTS OF FOURTH CONFERENCE (April 30, 1949)

[redacted] furnished to the Bureau on May 11, 1949, the minutes of the fourth Committee meeting. From a review of these minutes prepared by [redacted] Executive Secretary of the Committee, which are attached hereto for your information, the following activity was noted:

Dr. Hans Speier outlined the report of the Panel on the Public Relations Aspects of Biological Warfare. Four points of particular interest were discussed at length. First it was pointed out that sooner or later some nation is likely to discover how to start an epidemic in a man and when that time comes, BW will become a unique weapon, namely a form of warfare over which, in our present stage of knowledge, we might have little, if any, control. Secondly, [redacted] remarked that with the exception of epidemic producing agents, the same principles

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regarding the public relations aspects or the national policy with respect to the use of chemical warfare would seem to apply in the case of BW. [ ]

[ ] reminded the Committee that three important characteristics of BW placed it in a different category from chemical warfare, namely, the lack of any practicable method of detecting the presence of BW, the time delay involved between exposure to a BW agent and its actual casualty producing effect, and the importance of the psychological impact of BW. Thirdly, [ ] emphasized that in current troubled times the moral leadership which the United States has assumed is one of the strongest weapons against the spread of totalitarianism in Europe. Tuve felt strongly that to maintain this moral leadership, this country should state publicly that we were prepared to consider the use of BW as a "limited" weapon but we would never resort to the use of epidemic forms of BW.

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[ ] took exception to the present stated policy of our Government to consider BW as a weapon of mass destruction. He emphasized that the Research and Development Board Committee on BW had, for various carefully considered reasons, already recommended that this position be reconsidered. General Waitt strongly urged this Committee to include a positive recommendation to this effect in its final report.

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[ ] presented a report to the Committee on possible BW applications of certain violations of the Food and Drug Act, with particular reference to the dissemination of BW agents through the medium of food, drugs, cosmetics and other intimately used items which are marketed on a national scale.

Mr. Robert P. Joyce, State Department representative, inquired what progress had been made with respect to having a representative of the FBI brief the Committee. [ ] reported that the FBI liaison contact for matters relating to the Committee's activities, had indicated that the FBI would prefer to submit answers to a list of questions rather than to send a representative to brief the Committee. The reason for this was that it was unlikely that any single individual within the FBI would have a sufficiently broad and detailed background to answer all the Committee's questions.

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The Committee appointed a panel consisting of [ ] and Mr. Joyce, as Chairman, to prepare a list of questions to be submitted to the FBI.

(The above statements are not entirely factually correct.  
Black was advised that you desired to continue to maintain a liaison

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

arrangement with the Committee until such time as the liaison arrangement had proven unsatisfactory. He was further informed that any specific questions he desired the Bureau to consider should be forwarded through our present liaison arrangement for consideration by the Bureau. It was explained to Black that the Committee's questions would be given full study and consideration by the Bureau and that some questions might entail considerable research. It was pointed out that the Committee might pose questions to which on-the-spot answers would not be nearly as complete from the Committee's standpoint as when the questions had been thoroughly analyzed and answered through our liaison arrangement. In addition, he was informed that probably in order to give thorough details and current answers to some questions which might be asked by the Committee it would be necessary that the questions be studied by various Bureau representatives handling the particular matter involved in the question.)

Mr. Joyce made available to the Committee an excerpt from a CIA report [REDACTED]

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The next meeting of this Committee was scheduled to be held on May 14, 1949, [REDACTED]

CONTACT WITH [REDACTED] May 9, 1949

On May 9, 1949, Special Agents [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] at which time he was advised that in the Bureau's opinion the twelve questions which had been informally propounded to the Bureau, were not calculated to obtain data from which logical conclusions concerning Biological Warfare potential could be drawn. It was pointed out to [REDACTED] by Special Agent [REDACTED] that if and when his Committee is considering anything within its jurisdiction the Bureau could be furnished with specific information as to how a plan could be carried through by enemy agents, how much material would be needed and the specific time needed, technical knowledge needed, etc. The Bureau would then be in a position to determine whether there are known enemy agents who would be capable of executing such a plan. This discussion followed the lines suggested in the recommendations of your memorandum to the Director dated April 29, 1949.

[REDACTED] expressed his appreciation of the Bureau's frank discussion of this matter and advised that in the future his Committee, when considering any possible plan of attack, would analyze the problem and boil

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it down to the point where specific information could be furnished to the Bureau upon which the Bureau could determine whether there are any known agents capable of perpetrating such a plan of attack. He was well pleased with the Bureau's answer and stated that the Bureau's suggestion of pin pointing specific types of information which his Committee should furnish the Bureau would help his Committee in further contacts with the Bureau.

ACTION:

Upon receipt of any questions from this Committee in connection with the captioned matter they will be carefully analyzed and an appropriate reply prepared for your approval.

*We certainly can't waste  
too much time on it -*  
*/*

~~SECRET~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD *HL*  
 FROM : MR. FLETCHER *HPF*  
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

DATE: May 13, 1949

PURPOSE:

*ms* To inform you of the results of contact of [redacted]  
 [redacted] by Special Agents [redacted]

BACKGROUND:

b6 You will recall that [redacted] in connection with his duties on the  
 b7C Committee dealing with Biological Warfare, informally requested the Bureau's reaction to twelve questions which were referred to in your memorandum to the Director dated April 15, 1949, and which questions would have called for the furnishing of detailed intelligence information to [redacted]

On May 9, 1949, Special Agents [redacted] contacted [redacted] at which time he was advised that in the Bureau's opinion the twelve questions which had been informally propounded to the Bureau, were not calculated to obtain data from which logical conclusions concerning Biological Warfare potential could be drawn. It was pointed out to [redacted] by Special Agent [redacted] that if and when his Committee is considering anything within its jurisdiction the Bureau could be furnished with specific information as to how a plan could be carried through by enemy agents, how much material would be needed and the specific time needed, technical knowledge needed, etc. The Bureau would then be in a position to determine whether there are known enemy agents who would be capable of executing such a plan. This discussion followed the lines suggested in the recommendations of your memorandum to the Director dated April 29, 1949.

[redacted] expressed his appreciation of the Bureau's frank discussion of this matter and advised that in the future his Committee, when considering any possible plan of attack, would analyze the problem and boil it down to the point where specific information could be furnished to the Bureau upon which the Bureau could determine whether there are any known agents capable of perpetrating such a plan of attack. He was well pleased with the Bureau's answer and stated that the Bureau's suggestion of pin pointing specific types of information which his Committee should furnish the Bureau would help his Committee in further contacts with the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATION:

The foregoing is for your information.

ESS:clh

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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Five-EXM

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR  
FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE DATE: April 29, 1949

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

## PURPOSE:

To inform you of the results of a telephonic communication with [redacted] made at his request and to inform you of the results of a review of the Bureau's files for additional information concerning Robert P. Joyce, State Department, and for information concerning [redacted] Department of Economics, University of Chicago; and [redacted] members of the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of National Defense on matters relating to the use of biological warfare in an unconventional attack by enemies of this country. To also inform you of the results of the Third Conference held by the Committee on April 16, 1949 in the apartment of [redacted].

Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. Clegg ✓  
Mr. Glavin ✓  
Mr. Ladd ✓  
Mr. Nichols ✓  
Mr. Rosen ✓  
Mr. Tracy ✓  
Mr. Egan ✓  
Mr. Gurnea ✓  
Mr. Harbo ✓  
Mr. Mohr ✓  
Mr. Pennington ✓  
Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓  
Tele. Room ✓  
Miss Nease ✓  
Miss Holmes ✓  
Miss Gandy ✓

CLASSIFIED BY UC/NLS/BIA/CP 6427 Derivative J.L.  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(0) 12/1/2029  
15-1224, I.T. 064 12/1/04 6.0207UC/NLS/BIA/CPB

## RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH [redacted]

[redacted] was telephonically contacted by Supervisor [redacted] of the Espionage Section on the morning of April 20, 1949, pursuant to his request. [redacted] was advised that in connection with the Committee's desire that a member of this Bureau brief the Committee on matters relating to biological warfare, that it was still the Director's decision that any questions logically coming within the purview of matters under the jurisdiction of this Bureau be handled through our already existing liaison arrangement.

[redacted] advised that no effort had been made by the Chairman of the Committee to arrange through the Secretary of Defense for a Bureau representative to brief the Committee inasmuch as the Chairman was presently out of the country and would not return for approximately two weeks. [redacted] indicated that some other arrangement could probably be worked out rather than making such a request of the Secretary of Defense.

[redacted] inquired whether he could secure the Bureau's reaction to the list of questions referred to in my attached memorandum dated April 15, 1949, the answers to which are attached to my attached memorandum dated January 10, 1949.

He also stated that the Committee did not know whether these questions were the pertinent ones to ask the Bureau in regard to this matter. He posed the question whether these questions were sufficiently pertinent to the matter to justify the amount of research involved in answering them. [redacted] also desired to know whether Supervisor [redacted] would meet with [redacted] and himself to draw up a set of questions which would be pertinent to the problem and which the Bureau would consider. He indicated that the Committee did not feel it was in a position to really know what questions to ask.

[redacted] was advised that this entire matter would be re-presented to you for your consideration.

Attachment  
CC: [redacted] Loyalty Section  
CC: [redacted] CIA Applicants

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/20/04 BY 60321 uc/nls/bia/cb

our place to tell the

Family

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RESULTS OF FILE REVIEW

ROBERT P. JOYCE

During an investigation by this Bureau of [redacted] captioned [redacted] an Agent of this Bureau attended an Italian "anti-Fascisti" meeting at [redacted] was reportedly prevented from entering this meeting by the police at Waterbury, Connecticut. The Bureau Agent covering this meeting determined that Robert P. Joyce was one of the eight members of the Yale Liberal Club, New Haven, Connecticut, who attended this meeting. (It has been determined that Robert P. Joyce attended Yale University from 1923 to 1926.) (61-1335-92 p.3)

In 1943 Robert P. Joyce was Coordinator of Intelligence and Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba. Joyce worked closely in his official position with intelligence representatives of the Armed Forces and Bureau representatives in Cuba. Our representative there in 1943 advised that [redacted] as an informant [redacted] at that time and that Joyce was on a friendly basis with [redacted] Our files do not reflect any additional information concerning Joyce other than that set forth on pages four and five of my attached memorandum. (64-4461-197X and 200X1; 64-23312-X2 and X; 100-16825-3)

It should be noted that we have not received a loyalty form on Robert Prather Joyce although he is employed at the Department of State.

[redacted]

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The Bureau files do not reflect any derogatory information on these individuals.

RESULTS OF THIRD CONFERENCE (4/16/49)

[redacted] furnished to the Bureau on April 22, 1949, the minutes of the Third Committee meeting. It was noted that [redacted] Chief of the Scientific Branch of CIA and [redacted] of the Committee on Biological Warfare of the Research and Development Board, National Military Establishment were new members of the Committee. (Bureau files are presently being reviewed on [redacted] and you will be advised of any pertinent information concerning these persons.)

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From a review of the minutes of the meeting prepared by [redacted] of the Committee, which are attached hereto for your information, the following activity was noted.

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[redacted] of the Committee, advised that arrangements had been made for him to proceed to London, England, on April 17, 1949, to study progress and plans in the field of Biological Warfare.

[redacted]  
presented a summary of Biological Warfare as it appeared to him today with an appraisal of the U. S. offensive - defensive position with respect to this weapon.

In summary, [redacted] stated as follows. [redacted]

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Negotiations are currently underway between various Government agencies to coordinate civil defense in the BW field. There is no rapid detection device for BW available. In regard to protection from BW agents,

[redacted] named three general categories: [redacted]  
[redacted]

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According to [redacted]  
[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

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In conclusion, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

It was noted in the minutes that [REDACTED] CIA's representative (C) to the Committee, furnished the Committee with intelligence information concerning [REDACTED] (C) b1 A copy of [REDACTED] statement to the Committee was not furnished to the Bureau because of a lack of availability of such copies. [REDACTED] advised Supervisor [REDACTED] that a copy was available in his office for review. In addition, the minutes reflected that [REDACTED] of the State Department presented a preliminary report concerning Public Relations Aspects of BW. No details concerning Joyce's report to the Committee were contained in the minutes and [REDACTED] also advised that this information was available in his office for review. (It is contemplated that the information contained in the reports by [REDACTED] and Joyce will be obtained from [REDACTED] at the time he is advised of the information contained in the recommendations of this memorandum.)

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*obtained 5/9/49  
by [REDACTED]  
is attached.  
Ehm*

STATUS:

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The next meeting of the Committee is planned for April 30, 1947, at the Pentagon Building.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

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It is recommended that [REDACTED] b7C revised:

1. The 12 questions under consideration are not calculated to obtain data from which logical conclusions concerning biological warfare potential can be drawn.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. Since biological warfare can be used as a morale weapon against the general public, as well as a means of sabotaging production, the following questions would be more to the point.

- (a) Is there any known biological warfare agent which could be successfully used against select groups such as the individuals in the Pentagon Building which was referred to in the minutes of the Committee meeting of April 16, 1949.
- (b) How could it be distributed?
- (c) Would any degree of technical know-how be necessary for distribution?
- (d) How bulky a parcel would it make before distributing?
- (e) What type and size laboratory would be necessary to prepare it?

With further reference to the minutes of the Committee meeting on April 16, 1949, what are the types of BW agents which could be used on a large scale against crops and animals and specifically how could such BW agents be distributed.

- (a) Would any degree of technical know-how be necessary for distribution?
- (b) How bulky a parcel would it make before distributing?
- (c) What type and size laboratory would be necessary to prepare it?

These are questions best answered by scientists. The questions of who might wage biological warfare and what steps could be taken to frustrate their plans are moot until the foregoing questions are answered.

EHM:mer:ew

*I will go along with this. I do want to indi- I agree  
cated cannot take up  
valuable time from more  
important things "coding"  
this project. The personnel of  
the Committee is somewhat question-  
able as to security & practicalness  
K. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*

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SERVICE UNIT

F-19a

SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor

1738

Subj: Robert P. Jones

☒ Exact Spelling ☒ Researchers

☒ All References ☒ Initial and

☐ Subversive Ref

Date 4-15-49

☐ Main File

☐ Restricted to Locality of

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

~~105-8611-7,9,8, X~~

~~44-21781-3 X~~

~~100-16825-3 X~~

~~64-3208-E-15 X check?~~

~~64-29833-56 X~~

~~100-346298-27 X~~

~~64-1201-537 X~~

~~64-29833-218-23 X~~

~~64-23312-X, X2, X~~

~~64-4461-197X, X~~

~~100-347627-4, 1, A~~

~~64-1335-92, 13, X~~

~~64-3006-13, 1, 2, 4~~

~~64-1211 X~~

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NLS/15jA/CB  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 11/30/2024

Initialed

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SERVICE UNIT

F-19a

SEARCH SLIP

b7C

Supervisor

om

1738

Subj:

Robert P. Gagne

Exact Spelling ~~SECRET~~ Searchers

✓ All References Initial ~~SECRET~~

Subversive Ref

Date

4-11-49

Main File

Restricted to Locality of

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

69-70543-116, X

64-22900-2, X

Robert Prather Gagne

~~SECRET~~ (S)

100-346298-27

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~~SECRET~~

Initialed

(2)

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SERVICE UNIT

F-19a

SEARCH SLIP

b7C

Supervisor 

Room

1738

Subj: ROBERT JOYCE

~~SECRET~~

Exact Spelling \_\_\_\_\_  
All References Initials \_\_\_\_\_  
Subversive Ref \_\_\_\_\_ Date 8-31  
Main File \_\_\_\_\_  
Restricted to Locality of \_\_\_\_\_

FILE NUMBERSERIALS

<del>67-77420 (per)</del>	<del>?</del>	<del>X</del>
<del>47-20452</del>	<del>?</del>	<del>X</del>
<del>26-64123</del>	<del>X</del>	
<del>26-31740</del>	<del>X</del>	
<del>26-88937</del>	<del>X</del>	
<del>116-38050</del>	<del>X</del>	
<del>116-123305</del>	<del>X</del>	
<del>62-83167</del>	<del>X</del>	
<del>94-2</del>	<del>24495</del>	<del>X</del> <u>3</u>
<del>52-35249</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>X</del>
<del>100-348044</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>X</del>
<del>100-3387</del>	<del>174</del>	<del>X</del>
<del>100-26912</del>	<del>278</del>	<del>X</del> <u>?</u>
<del>52-51426</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>X</del>

~~SECRET~~Initialed (3)

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SERVICE UNMT

F-19a

SEARCH SLIP

b7C

Supervisor

Room 1738

Subj:

Robert Lopez

~~SECRET~~  
☐ Exact Spelling  
☒ All References  
☐ Subversive Ref  
☐ Main File  
☐ Restricted to Locality of  
Searchers Initial Date 3-8

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

<del>65-31206</del>	<del>36X</del>
<del>64-27446</del>	<del>60, 41 X</del>
<del>105-5773</del>	<del>3 X</del>
<del>62-18359</del>	<del>2 X</del>
<del>100-211855</del>	<del>5p27, X</del>
<del>100-25300</del>	<del>10 X</del>
<del>65-30150</del>	<del>84, X</del>
<del>65-44610</del>	<del>163 X</del>
<del>100-350613</del>	<del>10 X</del>
<del>100-348044</del>	<del>4 ? X</del>
<del>63-15147-11</del>	<del>17p43, 24, 10p5, 15, X</del>
<del>32-30805</del>	<del>3 X</del>
<del>32-28140</del>	<del>1 ? X</del>
<del>91-2616</del>	<del>32 X</del>

~~SECRET~~

Initialed

(4)

b6

SERVICE UNPT

F-19a

SEARCH SLIP

b7C

Supervisor

Room

1736

Subj:

*Robert Joyce*

Exact Spelling

Searchers

All References

Initial

Subversive Ref

Date

Main File

Restricted to Locality of

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

*file section adv. that these serials have been destroyed*~~91-2616~~~~25, 24 X~~~~100-161120~~~~2101, 2448~~~~100-346290~~~~1920; X~~~~98-24125~~~~2 X~~~~100-2270~~~~34 X~~~~100-125-31~~~~51039 X~~

b6

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*R.*~~62-81093-34~~~~12470101 X~~~~87-4111~~~~22 X~~~~61-9182-~~~~1xp3; X~~~~62-81093-11~~~~52, 41 X~~~~SECRET~~

Initialed

*(5)*



THE DIRECTOR

April 15, 1949

MR. D. H. LADD

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/30/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/CB

Ag. 4, 5, 6, 12/1/04 60267 uc/nls/BJA/CB

PURPOSE:

To inform you of the results of the second conference held by the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of National Defense on April 4, 1949, at [redacted] Office in New York City relating to biological warfare from the standpoint of an unconventional attack by enemies of this country.

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BACKGROUND:

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You will recall that pursuant to your instructions a liaison arrangement was entered into with [redacted] (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon Building), [redacted] of this Committee, in order that the Bureau could be kept advised of the results of these meetings.

RESULTS OF SECOND CONFERENCE (APRIL 4, 1949)

[redacted] furnished to the Bureau on April 13, 1949, the minutes of the second Committee meeting. [redacted] suggested that Supervisor [redacted] might desire to discuss these minutes with him at a future date. A review of the names of the individuals attending this meeting reflected that Mr. Robert P. Joyce of the State Department; [redacted]

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[redacted] and [redacted] not further identified, were new members of this committee.

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From a review of the minutes of the meeting prepared by [redacted] which are attached hereto for your information, the following activity was noted:

[redacted] pointed out that the Committee was responsible to the Secretary of Defense and, therefore, would have the full support and aid of the National Military Establishment in securing information deemed essential to its studies. [redacted] urged that the Committee, in defining its area of activities, do nothing which would exclude it from all necessary fields of investigation. The Committee agreed.

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The Committee appointed a Subcommittee headed by Robert P. Joyce, and whose other members are [redacted] to prepare a preliminary study of the public relations aspects of biological warfare.

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment.

EDM:mer

100-93216-189

5-5

EDM 1010

100-93216-189

The Committee agreed that information concerning the strength, capabilities and probable intentions of the "underground" within the U. S. was essential to the study of its problems. The Committee then instructed [ ] to make the necessary arrangements through the Secretary of Defense to have a representative of the FBI brief the Committee on this general subject. The Committee tabled a list of questions attached as Exhibit 3 which had been prepared in connection with this matter for this meeting. (It is noted that many of these questions are the same questions previously drawn up by [ ] the answers to which were submitted to you in my memorandum dated January 10, 1949. The original memorandum and the answers thereto are attached for your further information.)

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[ ] suggested that a study of the violations of the Pure Food and Drug Act might reveal unusual possibilities for biological warfare. [ ] was appointed to review the violations of the Pure Food and Drug Act for the next meeting.

The psychological aspects of biological warfare were discussed by the Committee. It was noted that the "moral hazard" of biological warfare was considerable and that if biological warfare were used against the U. S. the Committee felt that serious consideration should be given to whether greater moral and military advantage would be gained by retaliation in kind or by abstaining from using biological warfare. It was also pointed out that in regard to our own psychology, the possibility exists that absolute proof of the clandestine employment of biological warfare against us by a foreign power might precipitate a demand for a preventive war.

The minutes reflected that the next meeting of this committee would be held in NYC on April 16, 1949.

There is set forth below a review of the Bureau's files concerning members of this Committee.

DR. HANS SPEIER

Hans Speier was born in Berlin, Germany, on February 3, 1905. He entered the U.S. at New York in 1933 and became a naturalized citizen in April of 1940 at New York City. He is a scientist. In 1942 Speier was an applicant for the position of Senior Political Analyst at the Federal Communications Commission. During this investigation it was determined that Speier had been employed since his entry into the U.S. as a professor of sociology at the New School for Social Research, NYC.

The New School for Social Research was established in 1919, the purpose being to provide a medium in which adults might continue their

education under qualified instructors. European professors have been induced to teach at this School since 1930, the apparent purpose being to save for the United States the culture of Europe as reflected in the experiences of outstanding European scholars who were ousted from their professions in other countries due to the racial and ideological differences. Investigation conducted by the New York Office has indicated that the School is not considered to be Communist controlled or dominated and that the faculty is predominantly non-Communist. It has been determined from various sources, however, that the premises of the School at 66 West 12th Street, New York City, have been used on various occasions by alleged Communist front organizations. The Carnegie Foundation and Rockefeller Institute have in the past provided funds for teaching fellowships at this School. No other derogatory information concerning Speier was obtained during this investigation. (77-19940, 65-664673, 105-10303-4 p.3)

You may recall that in 1942 [redacted]

b6 [redacted] addressed a communication to [redacted] in connection with our investigation of Speier, at which time he alleged that he had learned that our investigation reflected that the New School for Social Research was Communistic. He also alleged that "Coughlinites" were well represented in this Bureau. (77-19940-10)

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Former confidential informant [redacted] of doubtful reliability advised in January of 1943 that Speier was either a German Communist, a fellow traveler or a Communist stooge. (116-103262-7 p.4)

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Through a highly delicate and reliable source having access to [redacted] it was determined in March of 1946 that Hans Speier appeared in [redacted] telephone reference book. [redacted] has been reliably reported as a CP member. (116-103262-7 p.4)

In May of 1947 through a highly reliable and delicate source the personal effects of [redacted] were made available to Agents of the Washington Field Office. The name of Dr. Hans Speier was found [redacted]

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[redacted] (116-103262-10)

In 1948 Speier was an Atomic Energy Act applicant for employment as a research scientist at Douglas Aircraft, Inc. During this investigation it was determined that Speier was employed from 1933 to 1942 by the New School for Social Research in NYC; from May of 1942 to May of 1944 as an analyst by the FCC, Washington, D. C.; from May of 1944 to December of 1946, as a propaganda policy adviser to the Office of War Information, Washington, D. C.; until September, 1947, as Associate Division Chief, State Department; September, 1947, to July, 1948, as a State Department Consultant; and from

September, 1947 to July, 1948, as a Professor at the New School for Social Research in NYC. Persons interviewed recommended Speier as being intelligent, loyal and patriotic. No derogatory information was determined from the individuals interviewed. (116-183262)

It is noted that we are presently instituting an investigation of Dr. Hans Speier, who is an applicant for a position with the Department of State in connection with the Voice of America Program.

ROBERT PRATHER JOYCE

This Bureau on April 6, 1949, instituted an applicant investigation on Robert Prather Joyce at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency. The application furnished by Joyce reflects that he was born on October 17, 1902, at Los Angeles, California. He is married and his wife's name is Jane Chase Joyce. His employment record reflects that he is presently employed by the Department of State as a member of the Policy Planning Staff, salary \$10,300 per annum. It was further noted that Joyce was previously employed by the Central Intelligence Group, 1946-1947; Office of Strategic Services, 1943-1946 (in this position he was stationed for a time at Bern, Switzerland); from 1928 to 1943 he was a Foreign Service Officer, Department of State. (It is noted that in 1943 he was Second Secretary of the U. S. Embassy in Cuba.)

b6 One of the five character references given by Joyce in his appli-  
cation was [redacted] who is a member of the Committee in the  
b7C captioned case. Joyce listed the names of Joseph Alsop and Stewart J. O. Alsop of Washington, D. C., who are well known to this Bureau, as social acquaintance and neighbor, respectively. (118-)

b6 During the investigation of Frederick Vanderbilt Field in  
July and August of 1943, it was determined that he visited Havana, Cuba,  
to attend the Congress of the Latin American Confederation of Workers, a  
b7C Communist infiltrated labor organization. It was reported that Field  
covered this Congress for the magazine "New Masses." The Cuban Police  
covered the subject's activities while he was in Havana and it was deter-  
b7D mined that while there, Field, accompanied by Martha Gellhorn Hemingway,  
wife of Ernest Hemingway, visited the residence of Robert Joyce, Second  
Secretary of the U.S. Embassy, and his wife, [redacted] This source reported that  
[redacted] You may recall that  
Frederick Vanderbilt Field has been reported to the Bureau as a Soviet  
espionage agent. (100-2270-24)

A highly reliable and delicate source made available the personal  
effects of [redacted] with aliases, on July 13 and August 13, 1948.

Included among these effects was a letter of recommendation dated November 26, 1945, To Whom It May Concern, written by Robert Prather Joyce, Special Assistant to the Minister of the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland. Joyce described Lieberman as an American resident of Zurich, Switzerland, a newspaperwoman of excellent standing. In addition, it was stated that "During the war Mrs. Lieberman rendered significant service to this mission. She showed great ability and resourcefulness and gave us frequent proof of her loyalty and personal integrity." In Lieberman's application for employment in March of 1946 with the United Nations Organization she listed as a reference Robert Joyce, American Legation, Bern, Switzerland. You may recall that [redacted]

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Additional file references are being reviewed on Joyce and you will be advised of the results of this review.

DR. FRANKLIN S. COOPER

[redacted] Haskins Laboratories, NYC, was listed as a personal reference by [redacted] at the time [redacted] applied for a position with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. You may recall that [redacted] was mentioned by [redacted] and from whom she received information relating to [redacted] activities in Yugoslavia. (65-56402-234 p.113)

The Bureau files fail to reflect any derogatory information concerning [redacted] Haskins Laboratories, NYC, Chairman of the Committee; [redacted] of the University of Wisconsin; [redacted] of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; [redacted] Carnegie Institute of Washington; Major General [redacted] of the Chemical Corps; [redacted] and [redacted]

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A review of the Bureau's files is presently being made for information concerning the two new members of this Committee, [redacted] and [redacted] You will be advised of the results of this review.

STATUS:

No known request has been received by the Bureau from the Secretary of Defense that a representative of this Bureau be appointed to brief the Committee as noted above.

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of our knowledge of [ ] contact with Jay Lovestone and the presence of [ ] and other questionable persons referred to in this memorandum as members of this Committee, I strongly recommend against a representative of this Bureau meeting with this Committee to brief them on information vital to our internal security.

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I recommend that Black be advised that any specific questions before the Committee which he desires this Bureau to consider be forwarded through our present liaison arrangement for appropriate handling.

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SERVICE UNIT

F-19a

b7C

## SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor 

Room 1738

Subj: HANS SPEIER

☐ Exact Spelling  
☒ All References  
☐ Subversive Ref  
☐ Main File  
☐ Restricted to Locality of \_\_\_\_\_

Searchers

Initial JSDate 4/7/68FILE NUMBERSERIALS

<del>77-19940</del>	<del>X</del>
<del>116-183862</del>	<del>X</del>
<del>45-6656</del>	<del>31 X</del>
<del>61-7558</del>	<del>299X1 X</del>
<del>62-17890</del>	<del>601, 247, 34, X</del>
<del>100-4399</del>	<del>14 X</del>
<del>65-29567</del>	<del>66 X</del>
<del>65-6656</del>	<del>20, 22, 15 X</del>
<del>100-34099</del>	<del>197 X</del>
<del>65-56442</del>	<del>247, 111, 120, X</del>
<del>110-200123</del>	<del>4 X</del>
<del>62-80335</del>	<del>3507, X</del>
<del>105-10303</del>	<del>4 X</del>
<del>123-918</del>	<del>5 X</del>
<del>100-20</del>	<del>558 X</del>
<del>65-56442</del>	<del>247, 111, X</del>

Initialed

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/2/04 BY 60327 uc/mj/18/jal

OFFICE OF THE

OF DEFENSE

22 April 1949

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/30/04 BY 602674C/NLS/BJA/CB

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Memo. for

Rm 1133 FBI

Attached is a copy of the Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the Secretary of Defense's ad hoc Committee on BW which is being distributed without Appendices B, C, and D because of the lack of availability of such copies.

File copies of these appendices are available in my office.

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RECORDED - 37

100-93216

32 MAY 20 1949

51 MAY 24 1949

A-2857



## OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO

OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*I think it would be well to summarize the pertinent facts re each of the members of the BW Committee operating under*

See Me \_\_\_\_\_ b6 ( )

Note and Return \_\_\_\_\_ ( )

For Your Recommendation \_\_\_\_\_ b7C ( )

What are the facts? ( )

Remarks:

*tutelage so we may get a bird's eye picture of this outfit.*

K.

*Memo Dinalos  
 5/9/49  
 E.H.H.*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/30/01 BY 60267 ac/ms/BJA/CB

ENCLOSURE

FIVE-5H

100 - 93216 - 191

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : D. M. IADD

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: May 9, 1949

CLASSIFIED BY *uc/hrs/BJA/CP60267*  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X11/11/2009

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E.A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

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Reference is made to the attached routing slip relating to the captioned matter on which you noted "I think it would be well to summarize the pertinent facts re each of the members of the BW Committee operating under Colonel [redacted] tutelage so we may get a bird's eye picture of this outfit."

Pursuant to your instructions there is set forth below a summary of pertinent facts appearing in the Bureau's files concerning the various members of the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of National Defense on Biological Warfare.

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[redacted] o Haskins Laboratory, New York City. This Laboratory has received grants from various philanthropic institutions to engage in biological research. Bureau files fail to reflect any derogatory information regarding this individual.

You will recall that Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] first came to the Bureau's attention in December of 1948 in connection with the above Committee when Secretary Forrestal advised you by letter dated December 20, 1948, that [redacted] had prepared at the Secretary's direction a preliminary report on unconventional methods of warfare which included biological warfare, fissionable materials and other techniques. This report recommended that a permanent unit be set up in the office of the Secretary of Defense to study this general problem and that the unit negotiate directly with other agencies on a cooperative basis. [redacted] report insinuated that the Bureau operated on a case basis and not on a counter intelligence basis. [redacted] confidentially advised the Bureau in December, 1948, that [redacted]

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[redacted] Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army, advised the Bureau's Liaison representative that at [redacted] request he had furnished to [redacted] a list of questions, classified [redacted] of information which was not available to the Intelligence Division but which might be obtained from this Bureau. It was indicated that [redacted] needed certain information relating to Communism and espionage for a thorough analysis of unconventional methods of warfare. According to [redacted] subsequently endeavored to use [redacted] for the purpose of securing the answers to these questions and [redacted] also furnished a copy of the questions to [redacted]. A review of these questions has reflected that a complete detailed factual answer to each question would have entailed exhaustive research and, in addition, because of the nebulous quality of some of the questions, a detailed answer was impossible. Many of the questions were propounded on an obvious inaccurate concept of the organization and activities of the Communist Party and Soviet espionage.

EHM:cew

The Hon. Director 5-31-49 EHM

~~SECRET~~

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

[redacted] subsequently  
confidentially advised the Bureau's liaison representative that [redacted]  
[redacted]

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In March of 1949 [redacted] submitted to the Bureau a memorandum relating to the clandestine delivery of a dummy atomic bomb into the United States in order to protect the vulnerability of the United States in this respect. An analysis was made of this memorandum and it was not felt that such a test would be feasible or wise because of the impossibility of simulating actual conditions under which such a bomb would be brought into this country by an enemy; it would be necessary that a live bomb be used for this test to actually test existing detection facilities and finally we already know that the United States is vulnerable in this respect.

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As you will recall, [redacted] is presently furnishing to the Bureau the minutes of the meetings of the Advisory Committee for the Secretary of National Defense on Biological Warfare. (62-89223)

[redacted]

This individual is well known to the Bureau as the wartime head of OSS.

Dr. Hans Speier

Hans Speier was born in Berlin, Germany, on February 3, 1905. He entered the U. S. at New York in 1933 and became a naturalized citizen in April of 1940 at New York City. He is a scientist. In 1942 Speier was an applicant for the position of Senior Political Analyst at the Federal Communications Commission. During this investigation it was determined that Speier had been employed since his entry into the U. S. as a professor of sociology at the New School for Social Research, NYC.

The New School for Social Research was established in 1919, the purpose being to provide a medium in which adults might continue their education under qualified instructors. European professors have been induced to teach at this School since 1933, the apparent purpose being to save for the United States the culture of Europe as reflected in the experiences of outstanding European scholars who were ousted from their professions in other countries due to racial and ideological differences. Investigation conducted by the New York Office has indicated that the School is not considered to be Communist controlled or dominated and that the faculty is predominantly non-Communist. It has been determined from various sources, however, that the premises of the School at 66 West 12th Street, New York City, have been used on various occasions by alleged Communist front organizations. The Carnegie Foundation and Rockefeller Institute have in the past provided funds for teaching fellowships at this school. No other derogatory

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

information concerning Speier was obtained during this investigation. (77-19940, 65-664673, 105-10303-4 pg.3)

b6 You may recall that in 1942 [redacted] of the  
b7C Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, addressed a communication to [redacted] in connection with our investigation of Speier, at which time he alleged that he had learned that our investigation reflected that the New School for Social Research was Communistic. He also alleged that "Coughlinites" were well represented in this Bureau. (77-19940-10)

Former confidential informant [redacted] of doubtful reliability advised in January of 1943 that Speier was either a German Communist, a fellow traveler or a Communist stooge. (116-103262-7 p.4)

Through a highly delicate and reliable source having access to the [redacted] that Hans Speier [redacted] has been reliably reported as a CP member. (116-103262-7 p.4)

In May of 1947 through a highly reliable and delicate source the personal effects of Ursula Wasserman were made available to Agents of the Washington Field Office. The name of Dr. Hans Speier was found in her effects. Ursula Wasserman is a suspected Soviet Agent who has been in contact with some of the subjects in the Gregory Case. (116-103262-10)

In 1948 Speier was an Atomic Energy Act applicant for employment as a research scientist at Douglas Aircraft, Inc. During this investigation it was determined that Speier was employed from 1933 to 1942 by the New School for Social Research in NYC; from May of 1942 to May of 1944 as an analyst by the FCC, Washington, D. C.; from May of 1944 to December of 1946, as a propaganda policy adviser to the Office of War Information, Washington, D. C.; until September, 1947, as Associate Division Chief, State Department; September, 1947, to July, 1948, as a State Department Consultant; and from September, 1947, to July, 1948, as a Professor at the New School for Social Research in NYC. Persons interviewed recommended Speier as being intelligent, loyal and patriotic. No derogatory information was determined from the individuals interviewed. (116-103262)

[redacted] Haskins Laboratories, NYC,

b6 was listed as a personal reference by [redacted]  
b7C applied for a position with [redacted]

b7D [redacted] You may recall that [redacted] was mentioned by [redacted]

[redacted] (65-56402-234 p.113)

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Robert P. Joyce

During an investigation by this Bureau of Carlo Tresca captioned "Italian Anarchist Activities," an Agent of this Bureau attended an Italian "anti-Fascisti" meeting at Waterbury, Connecticut, on March 25, 1923. Tresca was reportedly prevented from entering this meeting by the police at Waterbury, Connecticut. The Bureau Agent covering this meeting determined that Robert P. Joyce was one of the eight members of the Yale Liberal Club, New Haven, Connecticut, who attended this meeting. (It has been determined that Robert P. Joyce attended Yale University from 1923 to 1926.) (61-1335-92 p.3)

In 1943 Robert P. Joyce was Coordinator of Intelligence and Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba. Joyce worked closely in his official position with intelligence representatives of the Armed Forces and Bureau representatives in Cuba. Our representative there in 1943 advised that Spruille Braden, Ambassador to Cuba, employed Ernest Hemingway as an informant of the Embassy at that time and that Joyce was on a friendly basis with Hemingway. (64-4461-197X and 200X1; 64-23312-X2 and X; 100-16825-3)

During the investigation of [redacted] in July and August of 1943, it was determined that he visited Havana, Cuba, to attend the Congress of the Latin American Confederation of Workers, a Communist infiltrated labor organization. It was reported that [redacted] covered this Congress for the magazine "New Masses." [redacted]

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[redacted] This source reported that [redacted] was a good friend of [redacted] You may recall that [redacted] has been reported to the Bureau as a Soviet espionage agent. (100-2278-34)


A highly reliable and delicate source made available [redacted]

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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR



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This Bureau on April 6, 1949, instituted an applicant investigation on Robert Prather Joyce at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency. The application furnished by Joyce reflects that he was born on October 17, 1902, at Los Angeles, California. He is married and his wife's name is [redacted] Joyce. His employment record reflects that he is presently employed by the Department of State as a member of the Policy Planning Staff, salary \$10,300 per annum. It was further noted that Joyce was previously employed by the Central Intelligence Group, 1946-1947; Office of Strategic Services, 1943-1946 (in this position he was stationed for a time at Bern, Switzerland); from 1928 to 1943 he was a Foreign Service Officer, Department of State. (It is noted that in 1943 he was Second Secretary of the U. S. Embassy in Cuba.) (S)(u)

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
One of the five character references given by Joyce in his application was [redacted] who is a member of the Committee in the captioned case. Joyce listed the names of [redacted] who are well known to this Bureau, [redacted]

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(118-15)(u)

During this applicant investigation it has been determined from a review of the State Department files that the following comments concerning Joyce were made by [redacted]

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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

[redacted] was interviewed by an Agent of the Washington Field Office at which time he stated that he did not care to make any comment on the record concerning Mr. Joyce but stated that he was willing to give information concerning

[redacted]

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He also remarked that [redacted]

[redacted]

The Bureau's files fail to reflect any derogatory information concerning [redacted] of the University of Wisconsin; [redacted] of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; [redacted] Carnegie Institute of Washington; Major General Alden H. Waite, Chief of the Chemical Corps; [redacted] of the Department of Economics, University of Chicago; [redacted] of the Scientific Branch, CIA; and [redacted] of the Research and Development Boards, Committee on Biological Warfare.

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ACTION: None. This is for your information.

Attachment

5-20-49  
[redacted]  
with summaries  
RWL  
per [redacted]

Wouldn't it be well to  
make available to [redacted]  
[redacted] the pertinent facts  
re these individuals.

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See 100-95216-192

~~SECRET~~

11/30/04  
CLASSIFIED BY ~~60361~~ ~~61A~~ ~~CB~~ 60267 Derivative  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 11/30/2029

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

[REDACTED]

In December of 1948 [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] had prepared at [REDACTED] direction a preliminary report on unconventional methods of warfare which included biological warfare, fissionable materials and other techniques. This report recommended that a permanent unit be set up in the office of the Secretary of Defense to study this general problem and that the unit negotiate directly with other agencies on a cooperative basis.

It was learned that [REDACTED] had requested a list of questions, classified secret, of information which might be obtained from the FBI. It was indicated that [REDACTED] needed certain information relating to Communism and espionage for a thorough analysis of unconventional methods of warfare. [REDACTED] subsequently endeavored to use [REDACTED] for the purpose of securing the answers to these questions and [REDACTED] also furnished a copy of the questions to [REDACTED]. A review of these questions reflected that a complete detailed factual answer to each question would have entailed exhaustive research and, in addition, because of the nebulous quality of some of the questions, a detailed answer was impossible. Many of the questions were propounded on an obvious inaccurate concept of the organization and activities of the Communist Party and Soviet espionage.

It was subsequently learned from a confidential source that, at [REDACTED]

In March of 1949 [REDACTED] submitted a memorandum relating to the [REDACTED]

Dr. Hans Speier

INDEXED - 98

100-93216-192

34 JUN 1 1949

Hans Speier was born in Berlin, Germany, on February 3, 1905. He entered the U. S. at New York in 1932 and became a naturalized citizen in April of 1940 at New York City. He is a scientist. In 1942 Speier was an applicant for the position of Senior Political Analyst at the Federal Communications Commission. During this investigation it was determined that Speier had been employed since his entry into the U. S. as a professor of sociology at the New School for Social Research, New York City.

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

52 JUN 2 1949  
W. S. Sauer 5/20/49  
R. W. L.

1cc - Paragon

File - 5 - ERM



~~SECRET~~

The New School for Social Research was established in 1919, the purpose being to provide a medium in which adults might continue their education under qualified instructors. European professors have been induced to teach at this School since 1930, the apparent purpose being to save for the United States the Culture of Europe as reflected in the experiences of outstanding European scholars who were ousted from their professions in other countries due to racial and ideological differences. Investigation has indicated that the School is not considered to be Communist controlled or dominated and that the faculty is predominantly non-Communist. It has been determined from various sources, however, that the premises of the School at 66 West 12th Street, New York City, have been used on various occasions by alleged Communist front organizations. The Carnegie Foundation and Rockefeller Institute have in the past provided funds for teaching fellowships at this school. No other derogatory information concerning Speier was obtained during this investigation.

In 1942 [redacted] of the New School for Social Research, addressed a communication to [redacted] in connection with the investigation of Speier, at which time he alleged that he had learned that the investigation reflected that the New School for Social Research was Communistic.

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Through a highly delicate and reliable source having access to the [redacted] that Hans Speier [redacted] has been reliably reported as a CP member.

In May of 1947 through a highly reliable and delicate source the [redacted] were made available. The name of Dr. Hans Speier was found in [redacted]

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In 1948 Speier was an applicant under the atomic energy program for employment as a research scientist at Douglas Aircraft, Inc. During this investigation it was determined that Speier was employed from 1933 to 1942 by the New School for Social Research in New York City; from May of 1942 to May of 1944 as an analyst by the FCC, Washington, D. C.; from May of 1944 to December 1946, as a propaganda policy adviser to the Office of War Information, Washington, D. C.; until September, 1947, as Associate Division Chief, State Department; September, 1947 to July, 1948, as a State Department Consultant; and from September, 1947, to July, 1948, as a Professor at the New School for Social Research in New York City. Persons interviewed recommended Speier as being intelligent, loyal and patriotic. No derogatory information was determined from the individuals interviewed.

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[redacted] was listed as a personal reference by [redacted]

[redacted] applied for a position with [redacted]

[redacted] was mentioned by [redacted]

Robert P. Joyce

During an investigation of Carlo Tresca in connection with Italian Anarchist Activities, an Agent attended an Italian "anti-Fascist" meeting at Waterbury, Connecticut, on March 25, 1923. Tresca was reportedly prevented from entering this meeting by the police at Waterbury, Connecticut. The Agent covering this meeting determined that Robert P. Joyce was one of the eight members of the Yale Liberal Club, New Haven, Connecticut, who attended this meeting. (It has been determined that Robert P. Joyce attended Yale University from 1923 to 1926.)

In 1943 Robert P. Joyce was Coordinator of Intelligence and Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba. Joyce worked closely in his official position with intelligence representatives of the Armed Forces in Cuba. It was learned that Spruille Braden, Ambassador to Cuba, employed Ernest Hemingway as an informant of the Embassy at that time and that Joyce was on a friendly basis with Hemingway.

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During the investigation of [redacted] in July and August of 1943, it was determined that he visited Havana, Cuba, to attend the Congress of the Latin American Confederation of Workers, a Communist infiltrated labor organization. It was reported that [redacted] covered this Congress for the magazine "New Masses."

This

[redacted] reported that [redacted] was a good friend of [redacted]

A highly reliable and delicate source made available [redacted]

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- 3 -

100-93216-192

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[REDACTED]

On April 6, 1949, an applicant investigation on Robert Prather Joyce was instituted at the request of governmental Agency. The application furnished by Joyce reflected that he was born on October 17, 1902, at Los Angeles, California. He is married and his wife's name is [REDACTED]. His employment record reflects that he is presently employed by the Department of State as a member of the Policy Planning Staff, salary \$10,300 per annum. It was further noted that Joyce was previously employed by the Central Intelligence Group, 1946-1947; Office of Strategic Services, 1943-1946 (in this position he was stationed for a time at Bern, Switzerland); from 1928 to 1943 he was a Foreign Service Officer, Department of State. (It is noted that in 1943 he was Second Secretary of the U. S. Embassy in Cuba.) (S)(U)

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One of the five character references given by Joyce in his application was [REDACTED] who is a member of the Committee. Joyce listed the names [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

During this applicant investigation it has been determined from a review of the State Department files that the following comments concerning Joyce made by [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] when interviewed, commented briefly on the Belgrade incident stating it was the influence of Mr. Joyce's wife which made the difficulty. [REDACTED] stated that by reason of her influence on Mr. Joyce and his lack of discretion, [REDACTED]

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100-93216-192

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information, which [redacted] considered highly confidential, [redacted]

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June 7, 1949

12:20

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON  
MR. LADD  
MR. NICHOLS

[redacted]  
of the National Security Council, called to bring me up-  
to-date on a session he had with [redacted]. He stated that  
[redacted] had indicated that they were going to brief [redacted]  
Under-Secretary of National Defense, on this matter tomorrow,  
but that he, [redacted] had very confidentially con-

[redacted] commented that he believed  
[redacted] was behind this. I thanked the [redacted] for briefing  
me on this matter.

Very truly yours,

*J. E. H.*  
John Edgar Hoover  
Director - 16

RECORDED - 16  
INDEXED - 16

100-93216-199

JUN 8 1949

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DATE 11/30/01 BY 60267 uc/nls/bja/CB

60 JUN 14 1949

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

cc-Mr. Nease

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 8, 1949

FROM : D. M. Ladd

5:25 p.m.

SUBJECT: B. W. COMMITTEE

Mr. Tolson ✓  
 Mr. Clegg ✓  
 Mr. Glavin ✓  
 Mr. Ladd ✓  
 Mr. Nichols ✓  
 Mr. Rosen ✓  
 Mr. Tracy ✓  
 Mr. Egan ✓  
 Mr. Gurnea ✓  
 Mr. Harbo ✓  
 Mr. Mohr ✓  
 Mr. Pennington ✓  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓  
 Tele. Room ✓  
 Mr. Nease ✓  
 Miss Holmes ✓  
 Miss Gandy ✓

[redacted] called me tonight and advised that  
 he had learned extremely confidentially that [redacted]

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[redacted] further stated that [redacted]

DML:FA

Well at least someone  
 in Pentagon is acting  
 with regard to common  
 sense.

RECORDED - 59

JUN 14 1949

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 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 11/30/01 BY 60247 UC/NLS/GA/CB

63 JUN 16 1949

Five-24m

2 Bacteriological Warfare

*FBI*

*mem*

*End*  
*1*

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

*file in Biological Warfare*  
27 May

from  office per  
your request.

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b7C

*1*  
*63*  
*EX-9*

*file 5 E.H.*

48 6108

*la*

RECORDED - 63

INDEXED - 63

EX-9

1100 - 93216 - 196

**FBI**

23 JUN 14 1949

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DATE 11/30/84 BY 60262UC/pas/bja/CB

53 JUN 22 1949 *A*

*Elmer*

*100 - 93216 - not recorded 5/26/49*

CHANGED TO

*65 - 58698 - not recorded.*

*C*

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE *11/30/04* BY *60267 uc/pas/Bja/03*



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/30/04 BY 60267 uc/pus/bj/1/03

*Edm*  
100-93216-198, 199  
CHANGED TO  
65-58698-23X  
100-354290-14X  
100-334289-19X  
  
C

SECURITY DIVISION - FBI

1949

TO: ☒ Director

<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Tolson	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. H. B. Fletcher
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Clegg	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Baumgardner
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Glavin	<input type="checkbox"/> M
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Harbo	<input type="checkbox"/> M
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nichols	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Laughlin
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Rosen	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Wall
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Tracy	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Keay
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Q. Tamm	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Whitson
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Mohr	<input type="checkbox"/> M
<input type="checkbox"/> Miss Gandy	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Ferris
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nease	<input type="checkbox"/> Foreign Service Desk
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Winterrowd	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Callan
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. J. A. Carlson	<input type="checkbox"/> See Me
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. E. J. McCabe	<input type="checkbox"/> Call Me
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Mohr	<input type="checkbox"/> Appropriate action
<input type="checkbox"/> Miss Art. Pennington	<input type="checkbox"/> Note & return
<input type="checkbox"/> Mrs. Metcalf	<input type="checkbox"/> Send file
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nease	<input type="checkbox"/> Bring up-to-date
<input type="checkbox"/> Mrs. D. J. [unclear]	<input type="checkbox"/> Correct
<input type="checkbox"/> Chief Clerk's Off.	<input type="checkbox"/> Re-date
<input type="checkbox"/> Records Section	<input type="checkbox"/> Please initial & return
<input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Files	<input type="checkbox"/> Place on record & return
<input type="checkbox"/> Mechanical Sec.	<input type="checkbox"/> Place on record
<input type="checkbox"/> Ident. Division	
<input type="checkbox"/> Technical Lab.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Reading Room	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/30/04 BY 60267 UC/ALC/S/ALC

D. M. Ladd - Rm. 5736  
Telephone Ext. 555

~~SECRET~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD *ph*

SUBJECT: *0* BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

DATE: May 31, 1949

Mr. Tolson ☒

Mr. E.A. Tamm ☒

Mr. Clegg ☒

Mr. Glavin ☒

Mr. Ladd ☒

Mr. Nichols ☒

Mr. Rosen ☒

Mr. Tracy ☒

Mr. Egan ☒

Mr. Gurnea ☒

Mr. Harbo ☒

Mr. Mohr ☒

Mr. Pennington ☒

Mr. Quinn Tamm ☒

Tele. Room ☒

Mr. Nease ☒

Miss Holmes ☒

Miss Gandy ☒

PURPOSE:

To inform you of the results of the fifth conference held by the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to biological warfare in an unconventional attack by enemies of this country. This meeting was held in the apartment of [redacted] on May 14, 1949, and was attended by the regular members of the committee and by [redacted] CIA representative; [redacted] Johns Hopkins University; and [redacted] Yale University. (The files are presently being reviewed on these three persons and you will be furnished with any pertinent information concerning them.)

BACKGROUND:

You will note that this is the Committee which was set up by [redacted] with the approval of former Secretary James Forrestal of the National Military Establishment to study various methods of unconventional methods of warfare. In connection with this program [redacted] has reportedly secured the assistance of Jay Lovestone. I have previously furnished you with memoranda in this matter reflecting that certain members of the Committee are at least questionable from a loyalty standpoint.

You will also recall that originally [redacted] requested that a Bureau representative sit as a member of this Committee. Pursuant to your instructions arrangements were made for our participation in these conferences to be solely through a liaison arrangement. Recently [redacted] attached a list of questions relating to Communism and espionage in the United States to the minutes of the third meeting of this Committee. The minutes reflected the questions had been tabled; nevertheless, [redacted] requested the Bureau liaison representative to secure an unofficial opinion from the Bureau as to the relevancy of his questions to the subject of BW. He was subsequently advised that his questions were not believed to be pertinent to BW and he was again advised that any problems which we could be of assistance to his Committee should be reduced to writing and referred to the Bureau for appropriate analysis. [redacted] has been advised time and time again that this is the way the Bureau desires to render any possible assistance to this Committee.

Attachment  
EHM:mer

62 AUG 15 1949  
138

RECORDED  
INDEXED  
65  
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~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

12/1/04  
DECLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]  
CLASSIFY ON: 25X [redacted]  
DATE: 12/1/2029  
pgs 243, 2, 3, 00A 12/1/04 00267 uc/pjs/gjw/cob

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/30/04 BY 60267 uc/pjs/gjw/cob

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100-23216-200X  
37 JUL 20 1949  
5- EHM

~~SECRET~~

RESULTS OF FIFTH CONFERENCE (MAY 14, 1949)

[redacted] furnished to the Bureau on May 24, 1949, the minutes of the fifth meeting of this committee which are attached for your information. From a review of these minutes prepared by [redacted] [redacted] the following activity was noted.

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[redacted] (S) CIA, and [redacted]  
[redacted] CIA, presented [redacted] (S)  
[redacted] (S)

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Security implications concerning this research subject were mentioned due to the possibility that lack of proper precaution might cause any present user to refine his techniques, might stimulate interest in non-users, might prove unsafe for public consumption and that knowledge of the existence of such a project might bring forth ridicule from misinformed groups.

Possible applications of such a technique by an unfriendly element were discussed. Examples were given concerning the suspected use of this technique by unfriendly countries. These examples included [redacted]

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[redacted] Reference was made to several newspaper and magazine articles.

Several possible uses of such techniques by unfriendly parties were covered. These uses included the extraction of classified information from an individual through subconscious isolation and detailed interrogation through regression. A simple means for the reproduction of the subconscious state was explained and the process of subconscious assignment covered, pointing out the possibilities of espionage and sabotage guidance of U. S. personnel through domination by foreign technicians. The possibilities of the instilling of false information into, and the eradication of information from the conscious memory were cited. Details were given concerning negative visual hallucinations and the surveillance possibility involved. The possible destruction and the re-creation of personality and character traits were explained.

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The Committee expressed considerable interest in the various methods of isolation of the subconscious mind which were discussed, particularly in the use of drugs as an aid to hypnotic techniques.

[redacted] indicated that:

[redacted]

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[redacted] of the Committee, presented a written report concerning [redacted] on behalf of the Committee, which reflected that [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the minutes reflected that Mr. Robert P. Joyce (State Department representative to the Committee, [redacted])

[redacted] reported that the overriding consideration in any request for information from the FBI must be

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It was recognized that the information received at this briefing would be treated in the strictest confidence. Under no circumstances would the material made available by the FBI appear [REDACTED] Whereupon the Committee instructed [REDACTED] to pass this suggestion on to the FBI through his established liaison contact.

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The Bureau liaison representative has advised that [REDACTED] is officially presenting this request by letter through Bureau liaison. *rec'd b7C and attached.*

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[redacted] presented a letter from [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] which he  
had prepared for the Committee's approval.

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[redacted] Department of the Army, advised the Committee that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not yet undertaken an active study of the military applications of BW for five principal reasons:

1. The Chemical Corps has yet to offer the Joint Staff what it considers a really satisfactory BW weapon. Although plans are available for the large scale production of a BW cluster-type aerial bomb within 6 - 8 months of the decision to go into full production, this method of employment has never been evaluated either by field test or by actual combat. Despite the fact that this bomb is believed to be more effective than its orthodox chemical counterpart, it is not yet an efficient bomb from the standpoint of obtaining the maximum effective use of the BW filler.

2. BW, although possessing great potentialities, is essentially a weapon of the future which at best might become of primary importance only after a period of 2 - 4 years further intensive development.

3. The present military policy is to use BW and CW only as retaliatory weapons in the event an enemy uses them first against us.

4. During the current period of investigation and research in the field of BW, the Joint Staff relies primarily on the Chemical Corps to recommend appropriate military applications for this weapon.

5. Although the Research and Development Board, in October, 1948, forwarded to the Joint Staff without comment a copy of the Noyes Committee's comparative study of biological, radiological and chemical weapons, the Joint Staff still does not feel it has the proper technical evaluations of these weapons to warrant at this time firm determinations as to their military usefulness or application.

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STATUS:

The next meeting of the Committee was scheduled for May 25, 1949, at the Pentagon Building.

RECOMMENDATION:

In spite of our repeated efforts to point out that we desire a liaison relationship with this Committee, we are once again back to [ ] original request that an FBI representative brief the Committee orally on "pertinent information along general lines concerning the strength, capabilities and probable intentions of the underground within the United States."

It is recommended that [ ] and a representative from the Laboratory familiar with Biological Warfare agents meet with [ ] of this Committee respectively, and Robert P. Joyce, State Department representative to the Committee, to find out what they want to know and to discuss the possible approaches to the Committee's problem in order to settle this matter.

Finally, it is recommended that [ ] be advised that we do not desire to designate a Bureau representative to orally brief the Committee, other than the contact above proposed, on "pertinent information along general lines concerning the strength, capabilities, and probable intentions of the underground within the United States" but that we will still consider answering any reasonable and pertinent questions concerning problems which come before the Committee after they are reduced to writing and furnished to the Bureau by liaison.

I agree

6-1

✓

Joyce  
JH



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. H. B. Fletcher *WFF*  
 FROM : V. P. Keay *VPK*  
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE *W*

DATE: June 10, 1949

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Egan	_____
Mr. Gurnea	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Pennington	_____
Mr. Quinn Tamm	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

You will recall that [redacted] of the BW Committee, addressed a letter to the Bureau recently requesting Bureau brief certain members of the Committee in connection with Communist information.

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At 4:45 p.m. today [redacted] telephonically inquired of SA [redacted] as to the status of the reply and as to whether a reply could be expected by tomorrow. SA [redacted] advised her that he would check into this situation and call her back. She was subsequently advised that it would be impossible to determine the status of the reply at this late hour but that probably they would not receive a reply by tomorrow.

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RWL:hke

*RWL*  
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100-93216-200X1  
 IF IB I  
 4 JUL 11 1949  
*July 20*

*5-11-49*

*memo to Director*  
*6, 20, 49*  
 250  
 260  
 AUG 11 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 11/30/04 BY 60247 uc/MS/CJ/MCB

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. H. B. Fletcher

DATE: June 13, 1949

FROM : V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

In accordance with the Director's instructions, [redacted] of the National Security Council, was orally advised by SA [redacted] of the activities and latest developments in connection with the [redacted] Committee" on matters relating to biological warfare. [redacted] advised he is already familiar with the Committee's activities and is following the matter closely.

b6

He commented that in his opinion the Committee will be more or less inoperative when its final report is submitted to the Secretary of Defense in the near future. He mentioned the fact that [redacted] had cautioned the Committee to confine its activities to bacteriological warfare and related subjects and not to expand into the internal security field.

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[redacted] said probably the Committee will soon be "out of the Bureau's hair." [redacted] indicated that he will keep the Director and the Bureau advised of any information concerning the [redacted] Committee which comes to his attention.

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RwL

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/30/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/CB

250  
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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 20, 1949

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/30/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this memorandum is to bring up to date most recent developments concerning the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to biological warfare (\_\_\_\_\_ committee).

BACKGROUND:

You will recall that you have discussed the activities of \_\_\_\_\_ committee with \_\_\_\_\_ of the National Security Council.

\_\_\_\_\_ had addressed a letter to the Bureau requesting that certain members of his committee be briefed regarding Communist activities.

In this regard you will recall that you suggested that \_\_\_\_\_ be briefed.

A meeting of the committee was scheduled to be held in New York City on June 11, 1949. On June 10, 1949, \_\_\_\_\_ was advised that a reply to their inquiry would not be forthcoming for use in the June 11 meeting in New York.

STATUS:

By memorandum of June 13, 1949, Special Agent \_\_\_\_\_ of the Liaison Section advised that, in accordance with your instructions, \_\_\_\_\_ of the National Security Council was orally advised of the activities and latest developments of \_\_\_\_\_ committee. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that he was familiar with the committee's activities and was following the matter closely. It was \_\_\_\_\_ opinion that the committee will become more or less operative when its final report is submitted to the Secretary of Defense in the near future. He mentioned the fact that \_\_\_\_\_ had cautioned the committee not to expand into the internal security.

\_\_\_\_\_ in the office of \_\_\_\_\_ advised on June 11, 1949, that the June 11 meeting of the committee was held, as scheduled, in New York City and that only one more meeting of the committee was scheduled. This will be held on June 25, 1949, at the Pentagon.

A special memorandum dealing with Communist Party organization and activities, including the underground organization of the Communist Party, is

53 AUG 11 1949

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now being prepared for distribution to the members of the National Security Council. This distribution will occur prior to the June 25 meeting of [redacted] committee. The contents of this memorandum will answer, for all practical purposes, the general inquiries made by [redacted] concerning the Communist Party underground in the United States.

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No further requests from [redacted] have been received.

ACTION:

Since the above mentioned memorandum on Communist Party organization and activities will cover the material requested by [redacted] and will be distributed prior to the next and last scheduled meeting of his committee, it is recommended that no additional oral briefing be considered for [redacted] and his committee members.

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*I agree.*

*right  
OK  
✓*

Director, FBI

June 20, 1949

SAC, New York

b1

(S) [REDACTED]  
(BIOLOGICAL WARFARE)

11/30/04  
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/DB  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (6) 11/30/2029

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Rebulet of May 13, 1949, in which the New York Office was requested to carefully study and consider the complete [REDACTED] (S) b1 [REDACTED] and to submit to the Bureau any helpful suggestions or information relating thereto.

With the thought in mind that the Bureau desires to place an intelligent Communist Party informant, who can be trusted by the Bureau and who has the complete confidence of [REDACTED] b7D

[REDACTED] the following names are being suggested as possible informants: b7E

[REDACTED]

cc NY 62-9428  
NY 62-9941

REGISTERED MAIL  
JRM:MEM  
100-93980

100-93216-✓  
NOT RECORDED  
76 JUL 25 1949

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

Letter to Director  
NY 100-93980

In view of the above, it is felt that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7D

[REDACTED]

b1

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Letter to Director  
NY 100-93980

[REDACTED]

b1

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

b1

[REDACTED] (S)

The New York Office will continue to be alert for other possible informants in instant matter and the Bureau will be promptly advised of any future suggestions. The Bureau is requested to advise the New York Office whether [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and no approach to either of them will be made until the Bureau so instructs.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267uc/pw/s/akb  
ON 11/30/09

RECORDED - 113

Date: August 8, 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BY REGISTERED MAIL

To: Director of Intelligence  
General Staff  
Department of the Army  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Chief  
Security and Training Group

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE;  
DR. THEODORE ROSEBURY  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Information has been furnished to this Bureau by a confidential source believed to be reliable that [redacted]

[redacted] recently purchased the book entitled, "Experimental Air Borne Infection Warfare" written by Theodore Rosebury and published by Williams and Wilkins Company. It is noted that you have previously advised this Bureau that Rosebury's book, referred to above, does not contain classified information of the United States Government.

The above data is being furnished to you for your confidential information.

cc - Director of Naval Intelligence  
Department of the Navy  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BY REGISTERED MAIL

cc - Director of Special Investigations  
The Inspector General  
Department of the Air Force  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BY REGISTERED MAIL

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 16

AUG 8 - 1949 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EHM:jpa

Handwritten signatures and initials: "John", "Egan", "K...".  
Stamp: "RECEIVED" with date "AUG 9 1949".



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : GUY HOTTEL, SAC  
WASHINGTON FIELD

DATE: July 5, 1949

SUBJECT: *pk*  
 @BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE,  
 aka @Biological Warfare, "BW"  
 INTERNAL SECURITY - R  
 Refer 5-IS  
 (Bureau File 100-2199)

On June 6, 1949, [redacted]

[redacted] telephonically

*Important  
disseminated  
per IDA  
EAM*

advised that [redacted] had recently purchased the book entitled, "Experimental Air Borne Infection Warfare" by THEODORE ROSEBURY, and published by Williams and Wilkins Company.

This information is submitted for the advice of the Bureau and the Boston Office.

GED:LEB  
 100-20142  
 cc - Boston (100-2199)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 11/30/04 BY 60267UC/wes/bja/crb

RECORDED - 56

INDEXED - 56

EX-94

100-93216-211  
 F B I  
 3 JUL 6 1949

*EAM*  
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cc

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RECORDED - 109

EX-28

Date : August 8, 1949

To : Director of Intelligence  
General Staff  
Department of the Army  
The Pentagon  
Washington 25, D. C.

From : Director, FBI

Re : BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60247 UC/NLS/GJA/CB  
ON 11/30/04  
# 977600

There is attached hereto for your information one copy of a "confidential" report dated April 28, 1949, which was furnished to this Bureau by a confidential source believed to be reliable.

The Federation of American Scientists referred to in this report was organized in November 1945 for the purpose of actively campaigning for international control of atomic energy and has approximately twenty organizations affiliated with it. Information previously furnished to this Bureau has failed to reveal any Communist control of the organization on a national scale, although there have been indications of Communist infiltration and influence in some of the local organizations.

Following your review of the attached report it is requested that you advise this Bureau whether the report contains any classified information of your service.

Attachment

cc: Director of Naval Intelligence  
Department of the Navy  
The Pentagon  
Washington 25, D. C.

Director of Special Investigations  
The Inspector General  
Department of the Air Force  
The Pentagon  
Washington 25, D. C.

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 15

AUG 9 1949 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AUG 19 1949

02 SEP 08 1949  
FBI  
RECEIVED  
SEP 1 1949  
JPM

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 7-21-49

FROM : SAC, Boston

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R  
REFER 5 IS  
Bureau File [REDACTED]ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/30/84 BY 60267 UC/NCS/BJA/CESReference is made to the report of Special Agent [REDACTED] in  
the instant case dated at Boston, December 9, 1948.

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Recently, the principal source of information in the latter report,  
[REDACTED] made the enclosures  
available to the Boston Division.

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Said enclosures consist of [REDACTED]

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The enclosures are furnished the Bureau and Washington Field for informa-  
tive purposes.

It is noted that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] will promptly  
advise the Boston Division.

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The Bureau and Washington Field are advised that [REDACTED] is considered  
a reliable and valuable confidential source of information by this division.  
In the event any of the enclosures are disseminated, care should be taken  
not to disclose his identity or make identification possible of him  
through a release of the text [REDACTED]

BSG/arm

100-21199

Enclosure

cc Washington Field, Enc.

cc 100-19119

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

RECORDED - 105

INDEXED - 105

EX-1

31 JUL 25 1949

100-93216-202

FIVE

get tag  
ccONT  
ENM 8/18/49